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Implementation of International Narcotics Control: 
The Struggle Against Opium Cultivation in 
Pakistan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1970's, the flow of heroin from Southwest Asia I increased dramat-
ically.2 In 1979, Pakistan alone produced an estimated 800 metric tons ofillicit3 
opium, making it the largest producer of illicit opium in the world that year. 4 
The total illicit opium production of Southwest Asia in 1979 reached a record 
total of 1600 metric tons. 5 The potential heroin production6 represented by the 
1979 bumper crop soon had a significant impact on the amount and quality of 
I. Southwest Asia includes the opium-producing nations of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. See 
Office of the White House Press Secretary, Briefing on Southwest Asian Heroin Initiative, Strategy 
Council Meeting, Aug. 21, 1980, reprinted in Federal Drug Strategy: Prospects for the 1980's, Hearing Before 
the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Prospects for the 1980's]. 
2. Introduction to Oversight on Federal Drug Strategy -1979: Report of the Select Committee on Narcotics 
Abuse and Control, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Drug Strategy - 1979]. 
3. Under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 
6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (effective Dec. 15, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Single Convention], opium 
production is allowed only for medical and scientific purposes. Id. art. 4. All other opium traffic is 
deemed to be illicit.ld. art. 1(8). As of 1980,134 nations were signatories of the Single Convention. U.S. 
Dep't of State, Pub. No. 9136.4 TREATIES IN FORCE, JANUARY 1, 1980, at 324-25 [hereinafter cited as 
TREATIES IN FORCE]. 
4. BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CoUNTRY NARCOTICS 
PROFILE PAPER: PAKISTAN 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PAKISTAN PROFILE]. The country of Pakistan is 
bordered on the east by India, on the south by the Arabian Sea, on the southwest by Iran, on the 
northwest by Afghanistan and on the north by the People's Republic of China. See R. NYROP, AREA 
HANDBOOK FOR PAKISTAN at xvi (1975) [hereinafter cited as NYROP]. Pakistan is administratively divided 
into four provinces. Id. The province of Punjab lies in the northeast, bordering India and encompassing 
the northern section of the Indus River valley. Id. The province of Sind lies in the southeast, bordering 
India and the Arabian Sea. Sind encompasses the southern Indus valley. [d. The province of Baluchis-
tan lies in the southwest part of the country, and borders the Arabian Sea, Iran and Afghanistan. [d. 
The Northwest Frontier Province (N .W.F.P.) borders Afghanistan. Id. Additionally, Pakistan includes 
the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Balistan. The Federal Government administers these areas which 
border India, the People's Republic of China and Afghanistan. [d. at xvi, 216-17. Cultivation of opium 
poppies occurs mainly in the N.W.F.P., with some cultivation in the Gilgit Agency. PAKISTAN NARCOTICS 
CONTROL BOARD, DRUG ABuSE CONTROL IN PAKISTAN 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DRUG ABUSE 
CONTROL]. 
5. Prospects for the 1980's, supra note 1, at 85. 
6. The proportion of raw opium to heroin is approximately 10 to I. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, 
at 1. Therefore, the 1979 opium crop in Pakistan represented a potential 80 metric tons of heroin, while 
the total Southwest Asian crop represented a potential 160 metric tons. Such figures are alarming when 
considered in light of the fact that heroin addicts in the U.S. annually consume only 3 to 4 metric tons of 
heroin. Prospects for the 1980's, supra note 1, at 86. 
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heroin entering the United States. In 1978, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) estimated that seventeen percent of all heroin reaching the 
United States originated in Southwest Asia. 7 In the first six months of 1980, 
sixty-four percent of all bulk seizures of heroin in the United States originated in 
Southwest Asia. s Further, the threat did not lie in quantity alone. The average 
purity9 of the Southwest Asian heroin seized during this period was seventy-
eight percent, while that of Mexican Brown heroin, the next largest category of 
heroin being smuggled into the United States,!O was 8.3 percent.!! 
The United States was not alone in feeling the impact of the 1979 bumper 
opium crop in Southwest Asia. Western Europe, particularly the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, was also severely affected. Prior to 1976, Southeast Asian heroin 
comprised most of the heroin seized in the Federal Republic of Germany.!2 
Beginning in 1977, however, seizures of Southwest Asian heroin began to in-
crease and, by 1979, according to one source, Southwest Asian heroin comprised 
most of the heroin present in the Federal Republic of Germany.!3 In 1980, 
practically all of the heroin seized in Europe originated in Southwest Asia.!4 
Smugglers have also been moving Southwest Asian heroin across India to Hong 
Kong and markets in the Far East.!5 
The Government of Pakistan is a signatory of the Single Convention of 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Single Convention).!6 In an effort to meet the obligations 
imposed by this treaty! 7 Pakistan, in 1979, announced the Prohibition (Enforce-
ment of Hadd) Order.!8 The Enforcement of Hadd imposed a total ban on the 
"production, possession, processing, manufacture, sale and use of all intoxicant 
7. Federal Drug Strategy - 1979, supra note 2, at 8. 
8. Prospect,for the 1980's, supra note I, at 93. Twenty-seven percent of bulk domestic heroin seizures 
consisted of Mexican Brown heroin, while 9% originated in Southeast Asia. /d. 
9. Bulk heroin often contains dilutants or adulterants. /d. 
10. [d. 
II. [d. 
12. Federal Drug Strategy - 1979, supra note 2, at 8. 
13. [d. quoting Peter Bensinger, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, V.S. Department 
of Justice. Southwest Asian heroin accounted for 70% of heroin in Germany in 1979. [d. 
14. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report on the 29th Session, 1981 V.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.4) 
para. 10 I, V.N. Doc. E/CN .7/668 [hereinafter cited as CND Report, 29th Sess.]. Ninety percent of 1980 
heroin seizures in Europe were of Southwest Asian origin. [d. 
15. [d. 
16. Single Convention, supra note 3. 
17. The Single Convention was supplemented in 1971 by the Protocol Amending the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs, March 25, 1972, 26 V.S.T. 1442, T.l.A.S. No. 8118 [hereinafter cited as 
Amending Protocol]. As of 1980, 71 nations had signed the Amending Protocol. TREATIES IN FORCE, 
supra note 3, at 324-25. However, Pakistan has not signed the Amending Protocol. [d. Therefore, 
Pakistan's obligations are measured solely by the terms of the Single Convention. 
18. The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, President's Order No.4 of 1979, Gazette 
of Pakistan, Extra., Part I, February 9, 1979, at 33-42 [hereinafter cited as Enforcement of Hadd]. 
(Obtained through the courtesy of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Government of Pakistan, 
248-B, F-6/2, Islamabad, Pakistan. Copies are on file at the offices of the Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review.) 
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drugs."19 Narcotics control efforts by Pakistani authorities have been a primary 
reason20 for the decrease in opium production in Pakistan since 1979.21 The 
Government of Pakistan has been assisted22 in its efforts by the United Na-
tions,23 the United States24 and the Federal Republic of Germany.25 In spite of 
the efforts by Pakistan and the international community, the illegal production 
of opium continues. In the 1980-81 growing season, Pakistani farmers grew 
eighty-five metric tons of opium. 26 One of the primary reasons for the continu-
ing flow of opium lies in the peculiar nature of Pakistan's tribal areas,27 where 
farmers cultivate opium despite the government ban. 2R Due to a combination of 
historical and political factors, the tribes in these areas, although administered by 
the Government of Pakistan, retain a large degree of tribal autonomy, especially 
in matters dealing with the administration of justice.29 Shielded from the nar-
cotics laws by their semi-autonomy and attracted by the potential profits to be 
made,30 the opium farmers of the tribal areas sell their product to international 
narcotics smugglers. Illicit heroin laboratories convert the opium into heroin for 
sale on illegal markets in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. 31 
This Note examines the nature of illicit opium production and trade in 
Pakistan and the narcotics control efforts that the United Nations, Pakistan and 
other countries have made thus far. The author focuses on the obligations of 
Pakistan under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,32 the efforts that 
the Government of Pakistan has made to meet these obligations, the aid pro-
19. PAKISTAN NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD, EXTENSION OF DRUG ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAMME IN 
PAKISTAN, at i, Pak. Doc. No. DiPNCBiDACIOl/80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as EXTENSION OF PRO-
GRAMME] (Obtained through the courtesy of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Government of 
Pakistan, 248-B, F-6i2, Islamabad, Pakistan. Copies are on file at the offices of the Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review.) 
20. Praspectsfur the 1980's, sUfrra note I, at 52 (statement of Mathea Falco, Ass't Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics Matters). Another reason for the reduced production is the depressed price of 
opium caused by the existence of stocks carried over from the 1979 bumper crop.ld. See also PAKISTAN 
PROFILE, supra note 4, at 1. 
21. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, sUfrra note 19, at 3. 
22. Assistance programs to Pakistan have ranged from enforcement aid, such as the training of 
Pakistani narcotics officers, to rural development programs designed to replace opium as the main cash 
crop in certain areas of Pakistan. See § VI infra. 
23. See § VI.A infra. 
24. See § VI.B infra. 
25. See § VI.C infra. 
26. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, sUfrra note 4, at 6. 
27. See § III infra. 
28. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, sUfrra note 19, at 4. 
29. N YROP, sufrra note 4, at 216. 
30. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, sufrra note 4, at 5. Although the price of opium is currently depressed, 
see note 20 sufrra, few crops can match the cash value of the opium poppy to the farmer. PAKISTAN 
PROFlLE,SUfrra note 4, at 3. The lure of such profits diverts resources away from the legal economy in a 
producing nation. Prospects for the 1980's, sUfrra note I, at 72 (prepared statement of Mathea Falco). 
31. See § II infra. 
32. Single Convention, sUfrra note 3. 
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grams by the United Nations, the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which assist Pakistan in meeting its treaty obligations, and the particu-
lar difficulties inherent in enforcing the anti-narcotics laws in the tribal areas of 
Pakistan. The author first reviews opium cultivation in Pakistan, with consider-
ation of the areas where that cultivation takes place and the illegal trafficking of 
opium and opiates from Pakistan. The author then examines the history and 
nature of Pakistan's tribal areas. This section focuses on the British tribal policy 
which shaped the modern situation in Pakistan and the current constitutional 
and administrative status of the tribal areas. This Note also examines Pakistan 
and the system of international narcotics control with emphasis on the interna-
tional control mechanisms and the obligations of Pakistan under multilateral 
narcotics treaties. The author considers the narcotics control efforts made by 
Pakistan, including the Enforcement of Hadd order prohibiting narcotics and 
the enforcement measures taken since 1979. The author further explores efforts 
that have been made by the international community to aid Pakistan in its 
anti-narcotics campaign. Particular attention is given to the programs sponsored 
by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and narcotics-
related programs in Pakistan by the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The author concludes with suggestions as to the further steps which 
should be taken to end opium poppy cultivation in the tribal areas of Pakistan. 
II. OPIUM PRODUCTION IN PAKISTAN 
A. Historical Development 
1. Poppy Cultivation 
The opium poppy has been grown in Pakistan for centuries. 33 Poppy cultiva-
tion takes place primarily in the mountainous regions of the Northwest Frontier 
Province (N.W.F.P.).34 Opium poppies in the N.W.F.P. are sown between October 
and December, and are harvested in late March to early June. 35 As a cash crop, 
opium has often sustained the precarious economy of the people in the 
N.W.F.P.36 Historically, however, production of opium in the area of what is now 
Pakistan was not large. 37 
During the period of British domination of the subcontinent, the British 
colonial authorities attempted to control opium cultivation by licensing opium 
33. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5. 
34. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1979, para. 89, U.N. Doc. FiINCB/47 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as INCB Report, 1979]. 
35. PAKISTAN PRoFILE, supra note 4, at 3. 
36. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
37. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 2. 
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farmers. 38 The authorities required licensed farmers to agree to sell their entire 
crop to the government.39 Following the partition of British India in 1947,40 the 
Government of Pakistan continued the licensing requirement in order to insure 
that opium farmers supplied only the legitimate demand for opium. 41 Under the 
British, the government allowed the quasi-medical use of opium,42 and the 
Government of Pakistan continued to allow this use until the Enforcement of 
Hadd43 prohibition in 1979.44 
2. The Increased Demand for Pakistani Opium 
Prior to the mid-1970's, opium production in Pakistan remained small,45 
primarily supplying the legitimate domestic demand and some illicit demand in 
38. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, sUfrra note 4, at 5. The licensing system was in effect only in the settled 
areas of the N .W.F.P. Id. For a discussion of the administrative distinctions in the N .W.F.P., see notes 
69-77 and accompanying text infra. 
39. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, sufrra note 4, at 5. 
40. The India Independence Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 30, divided British India into two 
nations, India and Pakistan. The partition of India had its roots in the rise of Muslim nationalism in 
British India. The Muslim League, a political party founded in 1906, NYROP,SUfrra note 4, at 29, became 
the vanguard of the movement supporting a separate Muslim state on the subcontinent. See generally id. 
at 29-35. Upon independence, Mohammad AliJinnah, leader of the Muslim League since 1934, became 
the first governor general of Pakistan. Id. at 35. For a description of the events leading to the partition of 
India, see id. at 29-35; K. SAYEED, POUTICS IN PAKISTAN, THE NATURE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE 8-24 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as SAYEED, POLITICS IN PAKISTAN]; see generally K. SAYEED, PAKISTAN, THE 
FORMATIVE PHASE 1857-1947 (1968). 
41. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, sUfrra note 19, at 4. 
42. Quasi-medical use denotes "the use of opium without medical aid for the relief of pain other than 
that caused by addiction to opium or to other narcotic drugs .... " COMMENTARY ON THE SINGLE 
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, U.N. Sales No. E.73.XI.l at 468 (1973). This definition 
originated in the Opium Protocol of 1953,14 U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 5273, 456 U.N.T.S. 3 Gune 23, 
1953). For a discussion of the 1953 Protocol, see notes 227,229 and accompanying text infra. The 
traditional forms of opium abuse in Pakistan are eating, and to a lesser extent, smoking. PAKISTAN 
PROFlLE, sUfrra note 4, at 3. Opium eating remains the most prevalent form of drug abuse in Pakistan, 
with an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 persons addicted to opium. J. GAMMELGAARD, INTERIM PROGRESS 
REpORT, UN/PAKISTAN PROGRAMME FOR DRUG ABUSE CoNTROL 4 Gune 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 
GAMMELGAARD] (Obtained through the courtesy of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Government 
of Pakistan, 248-B, F-6/2, Islamabad, Pakistan. Copies are on file at the offices of the Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review.) 
43. Enforcement of Hadd, sUfrra note 18. Until February 1979, opium could be purchased through 
322 licensed opium shops (vends) in the major towns and cities of Pakistan. Each person could purchase 
up to 20 grams of opium per day in each shop. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, sUfrra note 19, at 7. 
44. Although Pakistan signed the Single Convention, under Article 49 of that treaty, Pakistan made a 
reservation allowing non-medical use of opium in the traditional manner. See § IV infra. 
45. PAKISTAN PROFlLE,SUfrra note 4, at 2. Opium was being grown during this time by both licensed 
and illegal unlicensed growers. INCB Report, 1979,sufrra note 34, para. 89. Most of the opium poppies 
were grown on small plots in the N.W.F.P. PAKISTAN PROFILE,sufrra note 4, at 2. The level of illicit opium 
cultivation is difficult to determine. Estimates of illicit opium production in Pakistan in 1970 range from 
175 to 200 metric tons, and in 1971 from 20 to 160 metric tons. BRUNN, PAN & REXED, THE GENTLE-
MEN'S CLUB, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL 293 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BRUNN, 
PAN & REXED]. 
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neighboring Iran. 46 However, in the 1970's, a number of factors led to a sharply 
increased demand for Pakistani opiumY These factos included the growth of 
the European market for illegal opium and opium derivatives,48 and a reduction 
of opium cultivation in Turkey,49 Mexico50 and the "Golden Triangle" countries 
of Thailand, Burma and Laos. 51 Political events in the neighboring nations of 
Afghanistan and Iran reduced opium production in these nations, strengthen-
ing the demand for Pakistani opium.52 As a result of the increased demand, 
Pakistan became a leading producer of illegal opium for the international narco-
tics trade by the late 1970's.53 
B. The Smuggling Process 
1. Opium Smuggling Routes in Pakistan 
Smugglers transport Pakistani opium into international narcotics trafficking 
channels through a complex and traditional marketing structure.54 Until the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the chief route extended westward from Pakistan 
through Afghanistan by means of vehicles and animal caravans. 55 As a result of 
46. Iran remains the single largest external market for Pakistani opium. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 
42, at 5. Authorities believe that the majority of the illicit opium crop of Pakistan ends up in Iran.Id. 
47. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 2. 
48. Id. Heroin consumption in Europe prior to 1970 was negligible. Antonelli, Asian Heroin on tlu! 
Rise in Europe, 2 DRUG ENFORCEMENT No.3, at 34 (1975). The growth of European demand for heroin is 
evidenced by increasing seizures of the drug. In 1972, Asian heroin seizures in Europe totalled 22 lbs. 
Id. at 35. In the first six months of 1975, authorities seized 2 IO lbs. Id. Most of this heroin came from 
Southeast Asia. /d. at 34-35. However, by the late 1970's, the main source of heroin in Europe was 
Southwest Asia. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra. 
49. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 2. In 1971, the Turkish Government banned all opium 
cultivation as of the fall of 1972. The result of this ban was a reduction in the amount of Turkish opiates 
on illegal markets in the United States. Note, Alternatives to Indirect Control of International Narcotics 
Traffic, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 241 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Alternatives]. While the ban was 
later lifted, Cusack, Turkey Lifts tlu! Poppy Ban, 1 DRUG ENFORCEMENT No.5, at 2-7 (1974), Turkey, the 
major source of heroin for the United States in the early 1970's, has been overshadowed by other 
sources. Federal Drug Strategy - 1979, supra note 2, at 3. 
50. In 1975, Mexican Brown heroin accounted for 87% of all the heroin smuggled into the United 
States. Federal Drug Strategy - 1979, supra note 2, at 4. However, due to a largely successful crop 
eradication program carried out by the Mexican Government with U.S. aid, in 1978, Mexican Brown 
represented only 45% of the total heroin in the United States. 1d. In the first six months of 1980, 
Mexican Brown only accounted for 27% of all seizures. Prospects jar the 1980's, supra note I, at 93. 
51. In 1978, Southeast Asian heroin accounted for approximately 38% of the heroin present in the 
United States. Federal Drug Strategy -1979, supra note 2, at 7. Partly as a result of aid programs from the 
United States, but largely as a result of political chaos and a severe drought in the region, opium 
production in the Golden Triangle has decreased sharply.1d. at 6-7. In the first six months of 1980, 
Southeast Asian heroin comprised only 9% of all heroin seized. Prospects for tlu! 1980's, supra note I, at 
96. 
52. Ellis, Pakistan Under Pressure, 159 N AT'L GEOGRAPHIC, 678, 696 (May, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Ellis]. 
53. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at I. 
54. 1d. at 4. 
55.Id. 
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the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, smugglers now favor other routes which, 
until 1979, they considered secondary. 56 Presently, one m£tior route extends 
from the N.W.F.P. through the province of Baluchistan to Iran and the states of 
the Persian Gulf.57 Another passes south to the port city of Karachi, in Sind 
Province, where the smugglers transport the opium by sea and air to markets in 
Western Europe, the United States and the Far East. 58 Opium smugglers also use 
several other routes. 59 
2. Heroin Refining 
The smugglers process much of the opium which is smuggled westward into 
heroin or morphine base in refineries in Eastern Turkey and Southern 
Europe.6o Recently, however, Pakistani authorities have collected evidence of an 
increased capability to refine opium into heroin within Pakistan itself.61 Prior to 
1980, narcotics seizures in Pakistan did not include any heroin. 62 In 1979, 
authorities seized not only small amounts of bulk morphine.63 The following 
year, authorities seized sizeable amounts of heroin,64 and bulk morphine sei-
zures increased dramatically.6s A consequence of the increase in heroin and mor-
phine production inside of Pakistan is that since heroin is more compact than 
raw opium, it is more easily smuggled.66 Another consequence of a domestic 
heroin refining capability in Pakistan is the danger it creates of a greater domes-
tic heroin addiction problem in Pakistan. 67 In fact, the number of heroin addicts 
56.Id. 
57. Report on the meeting of the Sub-Commission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the 
Near and Middle East, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, para. 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/657/Add. 5 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Illicit Drug Traffic, 1981 Report]. 
58. Id. See also PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 4. 
59. Illicit Drug Traffic, 1981 Report, supra note 57, para. 21. Authorities in India have reported 
increased seizures of opium along that country's border with Pakistan, evidencing a smuggling route 
eastward from the N.W.F.P. through the Punjab. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 6. 
60. Prospects for the 1980's, supra note I, at 53. 
61. Id. Heroin refineries in Pakistan are discussed at notes 69-70 and accompanying text infra. 
62. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 6. 
63. Illicit Drug Traffic, 1981 Report,supra note 57, Annex IV. In 1979, authorities in Pakistan seized 
5 Kg., 765 g. of bulk morphine. Id. Illegal laboratories convert opium into morphine, and morphine 
into heroin. See Narcotics Bureau, Royal Hong Kong Police, Heroin in Hong Kong, reprinted in I DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT No.4, at 24-29 (1974). This conversion process requires an acetylation agent. Id. at 25. 
The most commonly used is acetic anhydride. Id. Recently, Pakistani authorities have noted a marked 
increase in the illegal importation of acetic anhydride into Pakistan. Illicit Drug Traffic, 1981 Report, 
supra note 57, para. 46. The United Nations has been considering taking action against the traffic in 
acetic anhydride. /d., para. 47. 
64. Illicit Drug Traffic, 1981 Report, supra note 57, Annex IV. In 1980, narcotics enforcement 
officials seized 8.5 kg. of heroin in Pakistan. Id. 
65. Id. Bulk morphine seizures in 1980 totalled 350 kg., 180 g. Id. 
66. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 4. 
67.Id. 
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in Pakistan is growing rapidly.68 One of the principal problems faced by narco-
tics control officers in this region of the world is determining the location of 
clandestine heroin laboratories. 69 These laboratories are operating in an area of 
Pakistan where authorities do not enforce the narcotics laws, the tribal areas of 
the N.W.F.P.70 
III. THE TRIBAL AREAS: HISTORY AND ADMINISTRATION 
Most of the opium cultivation in Pakistan takes place in the Northwest Frontier 
Province.71 The N. W.F.P. is composed ofthree types of administrative areas: the 
settled areas, the merged areas and the tribal areas. 72 The settled areas of the 
N.W.F.P. are totally integrated into the national structure and are governed 
directly by the N.W.F.P. Provincial Government. 73 The tribal areas are directly 
administered by the Federal Government of Pakistan, 74 but are largely governed 
by tribal law. 75 The merged areas76 are administered by the Provincial Govern-
ment and "are in the process of transition from the category of tribal to that of 
settled."77 Pakistani authorities fully enforce the narcotics laws of Pakistan in the 
settled areas, partially enforce the laws in the merged areas and do not enforce 
the laws in the tribal areas. 78 The majority of opium in Pakistan comes from the 
68. Haq, Growing Drug Abuse Assumes Alarming Proportions, Pakistan Times, Jan. 24, 1982 [hereinafter 
cited as Haq]. Heroin addiction has increased in Pakistan's urban areas in the past two years. Prior to 
this time, heroin addiction was virtually unknown in Pakistan.Id. As of January 1982, lOcases of heroin 
addiction were being treated in Rawalpindi, 55 in Quetta, 36 in Peshawar and 45 in Karachi. The 
addicts are generally between 20 and 30 years of age and many are university students. Id. 
69. Illicit Drug Traffic, 1981 Report, supra note 57, para. 50. 
The heroin laboratories are small and easily moved, allowing their owners to evade enforcement 
officers. Haq, supra note 68. The tribal areas are located in terrain which makes enforcement extremely 
difficult. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 5. The tribal areas are located in the Safed Koh mountain 
range. Compare NYROP, supra note 4, at 67-68, with DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5. These 
mountains reach an elevation of 15,620 ft. above sea level. NYROP, supra note 4, at 67-68. 
70. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 5. 
71. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 7. Some opium cultivation takes place in the Gilgit Agency 
in the Northern Areas. Id. 
72. Id. at 5. 
73. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 1-2. The settled areas ofthe N.W.F.P. are the Hazara 
Division, which includes the districts of Kohistan, Mansehra and Abbotabad; the Peshawar Division, 
which includes the districts of Mardan, Peshawar and Kohat; and the Dera Ismail Khan Division, which 
includes the districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Kahn. See DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 7. 
74. See § III. B infra. 
75. DItuG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5. The tribal areas, although administered by the Fed-
eral Government, are part of the N .W.F.P. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 1. 
76. The merged areas of the N.W.F.P. consist mainly of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, 
i.e., the Malakand Division, which includes the districts of Chitral, Dir, Swat (including Buner) and the 
Malakand Agency. See DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 7. However, the SwabilGadoon Division, 
although technically within the settled areas of the N .W.F.P., EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, 
at 70, has the status of a merged area. Id. at 73. 
77. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 2. 
78. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 3, 5. 
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merged and tribal areas. 79 
The tribal areas of Pakistan occupy approximately lO,500 square miles on or 
near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.80 Although farmers in the tribal areas 
have grown opium for centuries, only in the past decade, and especially since 
1979, has opium cultivation been large enough to supply illegal markets on an 
international scale. 81 This recent increase in cultivation in the tribal areas is due 
to a combination of the greater demand for Pakistani opium82 and the strict 
enforcement of anti-narcotics laws by the Government of Pakistan in the settled 
and, to a lesser extent, in the merged areas of the N.W.F.P.83 
A. British India and the Tribal Areas 
1. Background 
The British84 first came into contact with the frontier tribes when they de-
feated the Sikhs in 1849. 85 The Sikhs had previously "administered" the tribes by 
maintaining strong garrisons of troops at various locations and occasionally 
collecting revenue by force from the surrounding tribes. 86 The most remote of 
79. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5. The opium poppy is a highly remunerative crop in the 
tribal and merged areas, where small land holdings, depleted soil and inadequate irrigation prevent 
cultivation of many crops.Id. For example, in 1979-1980, a farmer growing opium on unirrigated land 
received an average net return of 1380 rupees/acre. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 10. Using the same 
land, the farmer's net return on an acre of wheat was 960 rupees, while maize gave a net return of 450 . 
rupees/acre. Id. One rupee equals .0976 U.S. dollars. Wall St. j., March 8, 1982, at 41, col. I. 
The tribal areas are an economically depressed area and the remoteness of the tribal areas insulated 
the region from economic growth until recently. See generally, A.S. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CHANGE IN THE TRIBAL AREAS, 1972-1976 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CHANGE]. This isolation has led to a shortage of gainful employment opportunities for the labor force in 
the tribal areas. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5. In many cases, persons in the tribal areas 
must depend solely on poppy cultivation to survive. Id. at 5-6. 
80. AHMED, SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 8. 
81. Interview with Akbar S. Ahmed, former Political Agent for South Waziristan and Visiting 
Professor of Anthropology, Harvard University Oan. 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Ahmed Interview]. 
82. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra. 
83. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 3. 
84. In the following discussion, the term "British" denotes both the British East India Company and 
the Government of India under the Crown. From 1757 to 1858, the British East India Company 
governed the British territory in India. NYROP, supra note 4, at 22-24. During the period of Company 
dominance, the British Parliament exercised an increasing measure of control over the ruling of India. 
Id. at 22. The Sepoy mutiny of 1857 led to the assumption of direct responsibility for the governing of 
India by the British Crown in 1858. Id. at 24-25. 
85. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 23. The Sikhs were a people living 
in the Punjab (the upper portion of the Indus River plain). NYROP, supra note 4, at xvi, 19. From 1799 
until 1849, a Sikh kingdom dominated the Punjab. Id. at vii. The Sikhs were allies of the British during 
the First Afghan War, 1839-1842. Id. at 23. The Sikhs later grew fearful of British ambitions and, in 
1845, attacked the British territory on their southeastern frontier.Id. at 24. The Sikh army was defeated 
in 1846 and parts of the Punjab were annexed by the British. Id. The Second Sikh war in 1848-1849 
resulted in a final British victory and annexation of the entire Punjab by British India. Id. 
86. XI A CoLLECTION OF TREATIES, ENGAGEMENTS AND SANADS RELATING TO INDIA AND NEIGHBORING 
COUNTRIES 389 (C. U. Aitchison ed. 1933) [hereinafter cited as Aitchison]. 
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the tribes had openly asserted their independence and the Sikh armies seldom 
penetrated into the hills to contest these claims. 87 When the British defeated the 
Sikhs, a large tract of undefined territory on the western bank of the Indus River 
passed to British India. 88 A series of attempts by the British to establish an outer 
boundary for India led to problems with the mountain tribes which, until then, 
had been, "for all practical purposes, independent of the rulers of the Indian 
plains."89 These tribes were fiercely independent and had traditionally made 
plundering raids on the plains.90 
The tribes which inhabit the tribal areas are subdivisions of a people the 
British called Pathans,91 although they refer to themselves as Pukhtuns or 
Pushtuns.92 These tribes have traditionally governed themselves according to 
tribal law which reflects Pukhtunwali, the Code of the Pukhtuns. 93 The Pukhtun-
wali is fundamentally concerned with nang or honor.94 Living according to this 
Code, the Pathans reconcile themselves only with great difficulty to situations 
imposed by outsiders.95 The world of the Pathans centered then, as now, around 
the principles of Islam and the Pukhtunwali. 96 The British, in their attempts to 
establish a northwestern frontier for India, confronted these fiercely independent 
tribes, which had never been conquered.97 
In the early 1800's, British power in India was largely concentrated in the area 
surrounding the Ganges River.98 In 1804, the British acquired Delhi and subse-
quently expanded their power in the Punjab,99 the Indus valley and the moun-
tainous regions of the northwest. loo As they expanded their territory, the British 
became increasingly aware that their growing land holdings on the subcontinent 
87. Id. 
88. Embree, Pakistan's Imperial Legacy, PAKISTAN IN A CHANGING WORLD 10 (M. Hassan ed. 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Embree]. 
89. Id. at II. 
90.Id. 
91. NYROP, supra note 4, at 123. 
92. Id. The Pathans are the majority ethnic group in the N.W.F.P.Id. Pathans also live in northern 
Baluchistan.Id. at 122. Pathans live in other areas of Pakistan as well. The city of Karachi has over one 
million Pathans living there. A.S. AHMED, PUKHTUN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIBAL SOCIETY 99 (1980) [hereinafter AHMED, ECONOMY AND 
SoCIETY]. 
93. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 89-90. The Pukhtunwali is the core of social 
behavior among the Pukhtuns. /d. at 89. The primary element of the Pukhtunwali is badal which is 
revenge. Id. at 90. Other elements are melmastia or hospitality to guests and nanawatee, which is the 
magnanimous honoring of peace offers. Id. Underlying all aspects of the Pukhtunwali is the concept of 
nang or honor. See id. at 9\-92. 
94. Ahmed, Introduction to E. HOWELL, MIZH, A MONOGRAPH ON GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH THE 
MAHSUD TRIBE, at vi (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOWELL]. 
95. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 93. 
96. Id. at 106. 
97. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 389. 
98. Embree, supra note 88, at 5. 
99. The Punjab is described in note 4 supra. 
100. Embree, supra note 88, at 5. 
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were vulnerable to attack through the mountain passes from Afghanistan. 'o, 
Coupled with this fear were two other pressures that weighed heavily on the 
British. First, the British were anxious to discourage the Pathan tribes from 
raiding the British administered and controlled plains. ,o2 Second, and more 
important, the growing Russian influence in Central Asia ,03 led a number of 
British officials to fear either a Russian invasion of India or a Russian-sponsored 
uprising of the Indian states. I04 As a result of these pressures, the British 
eventually established three frontiers for India. ,o5 
The "three-fold frontier,",o6 as established on the northwest border of British 
India, was composed of three zones with varying degrees of British control. I07 
The first frontier consisted of those areas under the direct administration of the 
Government of India,l°R i.e., the modern "settled areas"I09 of the N.W.F.P.lIO 
The third frontier consisted of the outer area of British influence, a buffer state 
which, in theory, would be independent, although tied to the Government of 
India by treaties or other obligations, i.e., Afghanistan. I I I The second frontier 
of India's "three-fold frontier" was the zone which today comprises the tribal 
areas and the merged areas of the N.W.F.P.1I2 One authority described the tribal 
territory as 
101. See id. at 5-7. 
102. See Aitchison, supra note 86, at 389. In the eyes of the British, their relations with the tribes 
were characterized by "the constant strife inevitable when a civilised administration marches with a tract 
inhabited by lawless men whose immemorial habit has been the plunder oftheir less warlike neighbors." 
Id. The tribes, resenting any interierence with their freedom, fought ajihad or holy war against the 
British, death in which meant eternal paradise for the fallen. HOWELL, supra note 94, at vi. 
103. A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN EUROPE, 1848-1918, at 298-99 (1977). After 
1825, the Russian Empire made gradual advances into Turkestan, which is north of Afghanistan. The 
British saw these advances as a growing threat to their position in India. !d. For a map of Russian 
expansion in Central Asia, see id. at 299. 
104. Embree, supra note 88, at 6. 
105. Id. at 2-3. 
106. The term was coined in CURZON, FRONTIERS 4 (1907) cited in Embree, supra note 88, at 2-3. 
107. Embree, supra note 88, at 4. The establishment of the "three-fold frontier" was not the re-
sult of a definitive plan. See geTIRrally, Embree, supra note 88, at 2-3. The unique nature of the frontier 
was the result of an aggressive British border policy which became known as the Forward Policy. NYROP, 
supra note 4, at 26. The Forward Policy, as embodied in the actions of Sir Robert Sandeman and others, 
beginning in the 1870's, envisioned the establishment of a "buffer zone" between the expanding 
Russian Empire and British India, while pacifying and controlling the border tribes. SAYEEO, POUTICS 
IN PAKISTAN, supra note 40, at 3-4. See also NYROp,supra note 4, at 26-27. The buffer zone envisioned by 
Sandeman would utilize the frontier tribes to maintain peace in their districts and as guardians of the 
highways through the area. SAYEEO, POUTICS IN PAKISTAN, supra note 40, at 3-4. 
108. EMBREE, supra note 88, at 4. 
109. See text accompanying notes 71-79 supra. 
110. Cf Aitchison, supra note 86, at 387, which describes the areas of the N.W.F.P. which fell 
under the direct administration of the Government of India. 
Ill. Embree, supra note 88, at 5. Afghanistan was never under British influence to the extent 
of the ideal model. Id. 
112. Compare the description of the tribal territory in Aitchison, supra note 86, at 387-88 with the 
map of the N.W.F.P. in DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 7. 
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a zone regarded as under the territorial control of the Government, 
but where the law and administrative forms, especially the systems of 
taxation, were not applied. Tribal chieftains continued customary 
forms of government, with general control exercised over them by 
the Government of India through subsidies and, ultimately, the 
army.113 
The line between the tribal territory and the directly administered, settled 
areas of the N.W.F.P. became known as "the border." II 4 On the other hand, the 
furthest extent of nominal British control, i.e., the frontier of India, was the 
Durand line,115 which ran on the north and west sides of the tribal territory, 
marking what is presently the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 116 
C.U. Aitchison, Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign 
Department, accurately describing the area between the border and the frontier 
stated: "This tribal territory, though included in India, is not a part of British 
India."117 The semi-autonomous status of the tribal territories was an anomaly 
resulting from the failure of British attempts to subjugate the Pathan tribes of 
this region by force. liS Beginning in 1852, the British waged numerous military 
campaigns against the Pathans of the tribal territory.119 
2. Treaties between the British and the Tribes 
One of the primary concerns of the British during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was to prevent the mountain tribes from raiding the plains 
and valleysYo The British attempts to conquer the mountain tribes led to 
113. Embree, supra note 88, at 4. 
114. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 387. A lengthy description of the border can be found in id. 
at 388. 
115. [d. at 387-89. The Durand Line was named for Sir Mortimer Durand, who negotiated this 
international boundary of British India with the Amir of Afghanistan in 1893. NYROP, supra note 
4, at 27. 
116. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 387-88. 
117. !d. at 387. 
118. Cf id. at 389-90 (summary of Britishltribal relations). 
119. [d. at 389. The major Pathan tribes of the tribal territories are the Utman Khel, the Tarkani, 
the Mohmand, the Afridis, the Shilmanis, the Shinwaris, the Orakzai, the Turis, the Waziris, the Daurs, 
the Mahsud and the Bhittanis. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 30-37. Many of 
these tribes have several sub-sections. [d. For example, the Afridi tribe consists of eight clans. [d. at 32. 
Since a description of the numerous battles fought between the British and the various tribes and their 
sub-sections would require a work of far greater magnitude than this Note, the description which 
follows deals only with the major factors which influenced British/tribal relations. The battles and the 
resulting treaties between the British and the tribes are described in Aitchison, supra note 86, at 
387-623. 
120. Embree, supra note 88, at II. The area inhabited by the mountain tribes is isolated and mostly 
barren. See note 79 supra. Historically, the tribes lived by exacting payment from those wishing to use 
the mountain passes to Afghanistan. NYROP, supra note 4, at 124. Plundering raids on the more fertile 
lowlands of the plains were another way of obtaining wealth that could not be found in the mountains. 
[d. 
1983] IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 211 
treaties l21 with most of the individual tribes. 122 Through the treaties' provisions, 
the British secured certain promises from the tribaljirgas (councils of elders).123 
Most of these treaties contained similar terms. 124 The treaty signed by the jirga of 
the Mahsud tribe on April 5, 1902 is typical of the British-tribal treaties. 125 
In the Mahsud treaty, the jirga promised, on behalf of the tribe, to remain 
loyal to the Government of India, to commit no offenses in areas occupied by the 
government or on roads and trade routes or against government interests. 126 
The jirga also promised not to harbor outlaws from areas occupied by the 
government. 127 In return for these promises, the government paid the tribe the 
sum of Rs. 54,000. 128 When a tribe or one of its members broke a treaty, the 
government levied a fine upon the entire tribe, since, under the terms of many 
treaties, the tribe was responsible for the conduct of its members.129 If the tribe 
refused to pay the fine, the Indian Government, as a last resort, could always call 
in the army.130 As long as the tribes honored their treaty obligations, they were 
free to govern their other affairs without interference from the British. 131 The 
From the viewpoint of the British such raids were inexcusable. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 389. The 
British considered the raiding tribes as little better than outlaws and the British Army organized many 
military expeditions against the tribes in retaliation for these raids. !d. In addition to retaliatory actions, 
the British quelled a number of rebellions by the tribesmen. These rebellions were often rooted in the 
declaration of a jihad or holy war against the "infidel" British. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY,supra note 
92, at 106. 
The dispute between the British and the Amir of Afghanistan from 1877 to 1881, and the resulting 
Second Afghan War of 1878-1880 caused a large number of confrontations between the British Army 
and the tribes. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 390. Consequently, in 1878, certain war measures were 
approved by the Government of India "in order to detach from all political connection ... those 
independent tribes on our border whom it is most important ... to bring under our own influence to the 
exclusion of that of the Amir." HOWELL, supra note 94, at 5. 
121. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 389. 
122. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 308. 
123. The treaties relating to each of the Pathan tribes in the tribal territory are reprinted in 
Aitchison, supra note 86, at 454-618. 
124. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 90. The jirga is a council of elders or mashars 
called to decide specific issues. Decisions of the jirga are binding on the parties id. and are based on a 
combination of Islamic law and Pukhtun custom. Id. at 90-91. Sanctions imposed by the jirga include 
ostracism and disobedience may result in fines or, in extreme cases, burning of the offender's house. Id. 
at 91. 
The membership of thejirga is not fixed and the number of members may range from five to fifty, 
depending on the importance of the issue at hand. Id. Each of the treaties generally guaranteed the 
tribes' independence concerning internal matters in return for an acknowledgement of the British Raj. 
Id. at 308. 
125. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 597-98. 
126.Id. 
127. Id. 
128.Id. 
129. !d. 
130. Embree, supra note 88, at 4. 
131. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 308. The British did, however, make some 
effort to control crime in the tribal areas. See notes 152-58 and accompanying text infra. 
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semi-autonomy fostered in large part through these tribal treaties continues 
today.'32 Indeed, Pakistan continues to honor many of these treaties. '33 
3. British Administration of the Tribes: The Establishment of Tribal 
Agencies 
When the British first came into contact with the frontier tribes, no special 
agency responsible for relations with the tribes existed. '34 The Deputy Commis-
sioners of six districts administered tribal relations. '35 In 1876, the Government 
of India reorganized these six districts into two commissionerships, the northern 
three composing the commissionership of Peshawar, and the southern three, the 
commissionership of Derajat. '36 Thereafter, the Government of India realized 
that a more defined method of administering relations with the tribes was 
needed, and established Tribal Agencies. '37 In 1878, the government appointed 
a special Political Officer for the Khyber Agency.'38 In 1892, the government 
established the Kurram Agency.'39 In 1895-96, the government established the 
agencies of North Waziristan,'40 South Waziristan'41 and Malakand.142 
Until 1901, the Tribal Agencies, with the exception of the Malakand 
Agency,'43 were under the direct control of the provincial government of the 
Punjab. '44 When the British created the Northwest Frontier Province in 1901, 
the administration of all the tribal territory '45 came under the Central Govern-
132. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 308. 
133. [d. Pakistan has no formal obligation to honor the tribal treaties. See notes 159-61 and ace om-
pan ying tex t infra. 
134. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 23. 
135. /d. These districts were Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi 
Khan. [d. 
136. [d. 
137. /d. 
138. [d. The Khyber Agency is named for the famous mountain pass of the same name. The 
appointment of the first Political Officer took place during the Second Afghan War. [d. The majority of 
the tribes in the Khyber Agency are sub-sections of the Afridis. [d. at 32. Other tribes represented are 
the Mullagoris, Shilmanis and Shinwaris. [d. 
139. Id. at 34. The British occupied the Kurram Agency in 1892 at the invitation of the Turi Shia 
tribe, who, being of the Shia sect of Islam, id. at 8, feared attack by the neighboring tribes of the Sunni 
sect. The majority of the tribes in the tribal areas are Sunni Muslims. [d. In addition to the Turis, the 
Kurram Agency includes the Para Chamkani, the Massozai, the Ali Sherzai and the Zai Musht tribes. [d. 
at 34. 
140. [d. at 23. Established in 1895, the North Waziristan Agency includes the Daur tribe and part of 
the Wazir tribe. Id. at 35. 
141. [d. at 36. Established in 1895, the South Waziristan Agency includes the Mahsud and part of the 
Wazir tribe. [d. 
142. Id. at 23. 
143. The Malakand Agency was under the direct control of the Government of India from the time 
of its creation. /d. 
144. [d. 
145. The Northwest Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) was organized on November 9, 1901. Aitchison, 
supra note 86, at 387. The N.W.F.P. is composed of the modern-day settled, merged and tribal areas. 
See id. 
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ment of British India. 146 
The duty of a Political Agent under the British system was to manage the 
relations between the Government of India and the tribes in his agency.147 The 
tribes remained, for the most part, self-governing and the law in the tribal areas 
continued to be based on the Pukhtunwali. 148 The Western judicial system was 
incompatible with Pathan sentiment. 149 In an effort to create a body of criminal 
law that could be enforced among the Pathans, the Government of India formu-
lated the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).150 The British originally introduced 
the FCR in 1871 151 and modified and amended it in 1887152 and in 1901. 153 Trial 
for enumerated offenses under the FCR was held before ajirga of the tribe to 
which the parties beionged. 154 After 1901, in any case where parties belonged to 
different tribes, a council drawn from jirga members of each tribe decided the 
case. 155 
The British experience in governing the tribes met with mixed success. While 
the British had succeeded, to a large degree, in containing the tribes,156 they had 
not succeeded in conquering them, 157 and the treaties between the tribes and the 
Government of India clearly reflect this difference .158 The basic obligation of the 
146. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 23. The British divided most of the 
tribal territory into agencies. Aitchison, supra note 86, at 387. The Deputy Commissioner of an 
adjoining district of the N. W .F.P. administered the remaining areas. /d. While administering the tribal 
territory, the Deputy Commissioner acted in the role of a Political Agent. /d. 
147. Aitchison, supra note 87, at 387. 
148. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 43-44. 
149. Haider, Evolution of Frontier Crimes Regulation, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICE IN PAKIS-
TAN 161 (S.M. Haider ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Haider]. See description of the Pukhtunwali at note 
124 supra. 
150. Haider, supra note 149, at 161. 
151. Id. Under the British judicial system and western concepts of justice, criminal behavior is 
ultimately defined in a manner which reflects societal notions of right and wrong. The same is basically 
true in Pukhtun society. However, the concept of right and wrong among the Pukhtuns, as embodied in 
the Pukhtunwali (described in note 93,supra) is fundamentally different from western perceptions of the 
concept. For example, in Pukhtun society, a person who kills another is not punished unless the killing is 
committed outside the laws of revenge recognized in the Pukhtunwali. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 
supra note 92, at 93-94. To use a western concept, a killing committed within the Pukhtunwali is 
'Justifiable." Under British law, revenge is not considered a justification for killing and a person who 
kills for revenge would likely be guilty of murder. See generally BLACKSTONE'S CoMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 941-49 (G. Chase ed. 1888) (description of the crime of murder). For a fuller 
discussion of the Pukhtunwali, see AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 89-97. 
152. Haider, supra note 149, at 162. 
153. Id. at 163. 
154. /d. at 162-63. The Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901, Regulation No. III of 1901, reprinted in 
FARANI, THE JIRGA LAWS 53-94 (1968). 
155. Haider, supra note 149, at 162. For a discussion of the modern application of the FCR (1901) in 
the tribal areas, see notes 192-202 and accompanying text infra. 
156. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 8. The British had set up a string of 
fortifications along the border between the settled areas and the tribal territories to contain the tribes. 
Id. 
157. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 92. 
158. See discussion of a typical treaty at notes 129-35 and accompanying text supra. 
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tribes under the treaties was to respect British interests and territory,159 in return 
for which the tribes received stipends,160 and governed their own affairs. 161 The 
Political Agent's primary role was to contain his tribes l62 and keep the peace both 
between the tribes and the British, and between different tribes. 163 
B. Pakistan and the Tribal Areas 
I. Constitutional Status of the Tribal Areas 
Pakistan gained its independence from Great Britain under the Indian Inde-
pendence Act of 1947.164 Section 7 of that Act declares the lapse of "any treaties 
or agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty 
and any persons having authority in the tribal areas."165 The treaties between the 
British and the tribes having lapsed, Pakistan inherited no formal obligations to 
the tribes. Despite this fact, the Government of Pakistan elected to honor many 
of the treaties, and continues to do SO.166 Pakistan has also continued the British 
system of administering the tribes through Tribal Agencies.167 In addition to the 
Tribal Agencies which were in existence in 1947, Pakistan has created three 
additional agencies which are similar in structure and function. 16s These agen-
cies are the Mohmand Agency, created in 1951, and the Orakzai and Bajaur 
Agencies, both established in 1973. 169 
The tribal territory of the N .W.F.P. is divided into two types of administrative 
areas, one administered by the Federal Government and one administered by 
the Provincial Government. 170 The Provincially Administered Tribal Areas have 
the status of merged areas, i.e., they are in the process of transition from being 
tribal in nature to being settled. l7l Currently, the government of the N. W.F.P. is 
159. See notes 125-33 and accompanying text supra. 
160. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. 
161. See note 124 supra. 
162. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 45. 
163. The agencies were created with little regard to ethnic configurations. As a result, tribes which 
had been in conflict since time immemorial were often in the same agency. ld. at 24. 
164. India Independence Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, Ch. 30. 
165. !d. § 7(IHc). The treaties that were cancelled by Section 7 are reproduced in Aitchison, 
supra note 86, at 387-623. 
166. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 308. 
167. See AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 7. 
166. ld. 
169. ld. The Mohmand and Orakzai agencies were created from tribal territory which had not 
previously been incorporated into a particular agency.ld. at 31,33. The Bajaur Agency was created 
from a remote subdivision of the Malakand Agency.ld. at 30. For a discussion of the Malakand Agency, 
see notes 142-43 and accompanying text supra. Malakand itself has the status of a merged area. See note 
76 supra. 
170. NYROP, supra note 4, at 216. 
171. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 2. The British included the merged areas in the 
tribal territory, i.e., they lie outside the settled areas. The merged areas are more remote from the 
centers of administration than the settled areas. !d. The Government of Pakistan and the Provincial 
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making an effort to enforce Pakistan's narcotics laws in these areas,172 areas 
which have traditionally produced much of the opium in Pakistan. 173 However, 
the more remote Federally Administered Tribal Areas,174 are largely governed 
by the Pukhtunwali and the Government of Pakistan has not enforced the narco-
tics ban there. I 75 
The Constitution of Pakistani 76 sets forth in detail the limitations on the power 
of the Government of Pakistan over the tribal areas. l77 The Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas fall under the executive authority of the Federal Govern-
ment, as vested in the President. 178 The control by the President is exclusive, and 
no Act of Parliament applies to a tribal area unless the President so directs. 179 
With respect to the tribal areas, the executive branch of the Federal Government 
carries out the legislative function. 180 The President of Pakistan is empowered by 
the Constitution to make regulations for the governing of all or part of any tribal 
area. 181 At any time, the President may also direct, by Presidential Order, that all 
or part of a tribal area cease to be a tribal area. 182 In order to limit this power to 
eliminate a tribal area, the Constitution requires that the President first ascertain 
the view of the people of the tribal area concerned, as represented in the tribal 
jirga. 183 However, the President has discretion as to the manner of ascertaining 
Government of the N .W.F.P. are in the process of integrating the merged areas into the national life of 
Pakistan. [d. 
172. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL. supra note 4, at 5. See also, the discussion of narcotics control in Pakistan. 
§ V infra. 
173. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 5. The enforcement of the narcotics laws in the 
merged areas has begun to have an effect on poppy cultivation there. GAMMELGAARD,supra note 42, at 3. 
Gradual enforcement of the ban has steadily reduced the acreage under poppy cultivation in the 
merged areas. In the 1978-1979 growing season, 304,680 acres of opium poppies were grown in the 
merged areas. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 5. In 1979-1980 this was reduced to 9,500 
acres. Poppy production in the merged areas is continuing, largely due to the fact that opium poppies 
generate high income, id., in an area where there is little irrigation and poor soil for farming. DRUG 
ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5-6. The United Nations, the United States, and the Federal Republic 
of Germany are or will be carrying out integrated rural development programs designed to eliminate 
the poppy as the main cash crop of the merged areas. See § VI infra. 
174. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas include the agencies of Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, 
Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, 
supra note 79, at 7. In addition to the agencies, certain smaller tribal regions, known as Frontier Regions, 
are also included in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Compare [d., at 37 with NYROp,supra note 
4, at 216. These Frontier Regions adjoin the settled districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera 
Ismail Khan. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE,supra note 79, at 37. Hereinafter, the term "tribal 
areas" will denote the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The Provincially Administered Tribal 
Areas will be referred to as "merged areas". 
175. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5. 
176. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. 
177. [d. Part XII, Chapter 3, § 247. 
178. [d. § 247( I) and (3). 
179. [d. § 247(3). 
180. Seegenerallyid. § 247. 
181. [d. § 247(5). 
182. [d. § 247(6). 
183. !d. 
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the views of the people.184 The Constitution similarly excludes the judiciary from 
the tribal areas. No court may exercise jurisdiction in relation to a tribal area. 185 
Instead, the judicial function is divided between the executive branch and the 
tribal jirga. 186 
2. Administration and Law Enforcement in the Tribal Areas 
Locally, the administration of the tribal area is vested in the office of the 
Political Agent for each Tribal Agency, as it was under the British. 187 One 
commentator described the role of the Political Agent as "half-ambassador and 
half-governor."188 The Agent, in his person, represents the government itself.1 89 
Due to the difficulty involved in administering a semi-autonomous people, much 
of the administration depends on the Political Agent's personality and relations 
with the tribes and tribal leaders. 190 Immediately below the Political Agent in the 
administrative structure of a typical tribal agency191 is the Assistant Political 
Agent. 192 The next level is that of the Political Tehsildar, who supervises a 
number of Political Naib-Tehsildars.193 "Each Political Tehsiidar/Naib-Tehsildar 
is in charge of distinct tribes. As tribes in the Tribal Areas live within specific 
boundaries that correspond to geographical or physical areas, the Agency is 
divided both by tribe and area for purposes of administration."194 
The regular criminal, civil and revenue laws of Pakistan do not apply in the 
tribal areas. 195 The tribes conduct their own affairs through tribal law based on 
the Pukhtunwali. 196 However, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (FCR),197 
which Pakistan inherited at the time of its independence, is applicable in the 
tribal areas. 198 The Political Agent is responsible for the enforcement of the FCR 
184. [d. 
185. [d. § 247(7). 
186. The triba1jirga decides cases which arise under tribal law . AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra 
note 92, at 90-91. Enforcement occurs largely through public opinion. NYROp,supra note 4, at 160. See 
also note 124 supra. Cases decided under the FCR involve a wide scope of discretion by the Political 
Agent. The FCR allows the Agent general judicial authority to impose sentences for crimes committed 
under the FCR. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 311. 
187. See genliTally, AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE,supra note 79, at 43-45. For a discussion 
of the Political Agent's role under the British, see § III A. 3 supra. 
188. [d. at 43, citing J. SPAIN, THE WAY OF THE PATHANS 24 (1972). 
189. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 43. 
190. [d. at 44. 
191. The administrative scheme outlined here is that of the Orakzai Agency as outlined in id. at 
44-45. 
192. [d. at 44. Most Tribal Agencies have two Assistant Political Agents. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. [d. at 45. 
195. [d. at 43-44. 
196. [d. 
197. NYROP, supra note 4, at 216. 
198. Haider, supra note 149, at 165, citing MuJwalli v. Croum, P.L.D. 1951, Peshawar 45. The British 
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and any other laws the President of Pakistan may make applicable to the tribal 
areas I99 since the police of the N. W. F. P. do not enter the tribal areas.200 The 
Agent's only police forces inside of the agency are the Frontier Scouts of the 
Frontier Corps201 and the khassadars. 202 In addition to these forces, the Political 
Agent could, in an emergency, call on units of the Frontier Constabulary which 
are stationed near the tribal areas. 203 With these forces, the Political Officers in 
each agency are able to maintain peace between the tribes and ensure "that no 
law and order problem assumes uncontrollable proportions."204 However, in 
practice, the Political Agent's enforcement of the FCR is usually limited to the 
main roads and the agency headquarters. 205 
Although the modern administrative structure of the tribal areas is similar to 
the structure which existed under the British,206 the attitude of the Pakistani 
Government toward the tribes is quite different from that of the British. 207 One 
of the first steps the new government took after independence was the with-
drawal of all troops posted along the border between the tribal areas and the 
designed the FCR 1901 to be a body of law more in accord with Pathan sentiment than the regular 
criminal laws of British India. Haider, supra note 149. at 161. See also notes 151-56 and accompanying 
text supra. However, although the tribaljirga tries offenders under the FCR, the FCR itself is essentially 
a western criminal code and, therefore, is in conflict with the notions of justice embodied in the 
Pukhtunwali. For a discussion of this conflict, see note 153 supra. For a discussion of the Pukhtunwali itself, 
see note 93 supra. See also AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 89-97. The Pukhtunwali 
remains the primary code of the tribal areas. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 
43-44. 
199. See generally, AHMED, SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 43-45. 
200. The police function in Pakistan is largely carried out on the provincial level. NYROP, supra note 
4, at 343. The police forces of the N.W.F.P. do not enter the tribal areas because they have no 
jurisdiction there. Federal police forces such as the Frontier Corps police the tribal areas. See note 201 
infra. 
201. Id. at 43. The Frontier Corps is an auxiliary force of Pakistan's army. NYROP, supra note 4, at 
388. Units of the Frontier Corps are located within the tribal agencies. Id. at 347. While most of the 
officers of the Frontier Corps are from the regular army, the force itself is composed entirely oflocally 
recruited Pat hans who are not, strictly speaking, army personnel. Id. at 388. While the Corps is available 
to the Political Agent, it is not directly under his command. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SoCIETY, supra note 
92, at 311. 
202. The khassadars are a semi-official tribal police force. AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 
92, at 366. The khassadars are under the direct command of the Political Agent. !d. 
203. NYROP, supra note 4. at 347. The Frontier Constabulary is a police force of the Federal 
Government. The duties of the Constabulary include the prevention of tribal raids into the settled areas 
and prevention of smuggling and other illegal entry into the country. The Federal Government may 
also direct the Frontier Constabulary to assist other police forces.ld. 
204. AHMED. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 44. 
205. While the FCR gives wide judicial authority to impose punishment to the Political Agent, 
AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 311, the role of the Political Agent requires that 
problems be solved within the institutional and structural boundaries of the tribal society.ld. To rigidly 
enforce the FCR in the tribal areas would require the use of force against the tribes. which is seen as an 
admission that the Political Agent has failed to fulfill his role of working with the tribal society. Id. 
206. See notes 137-48 and accompanying text supra. 
207. See AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 99. 
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settled areas.208 The removal of this military barrier led to a greater identifica-
tion of the people of the tribal areas with the state of Pakistan. 209 
In the 1970's, the Government of Pakistan changed its tribal policy, causing an 
expansion of the Political Agent's role. 210 In 1973, then-Prime Minister Bhutto 
began an economic program designed to modernize the tribal areas.211 This 
program involved the building of new roads, schools and dispensaries. 212 As a 
result of these projects, the Political Agent has become the main force behind 
development and change, rather than merely the upholder of the status quO. 213 
The Political Agent is the project director of the Rural Works Programme in his 
agency.214 As both project director and the person responsible to the govern-
ment for the tribes, the agent is involved in all aspects of the economic programs 
in his agency.215 A former Political Agent has suggested that the increasing 
demands upon the office of the Political Agent may lead either to a greater 
sharing of his responsibilities with local tribal councils or to a greater delegation 
of the Agent's responsibilities within the existing administrative framework. 216 
3. The Tribal Areas and Pakistan's Narcotics Laws 
The historical development of the tribal areas under the British and Pakistani 
governments sheds light on the particular problems facing any attempt to en-
force Pakistan's ban on opium production in the tribal areas. The Pathans of the 
tribal areas, although identifying more closely with Pakistan than they did with 
British India,217 still live according to the Pukhtunwali. 218 Pakistan, although not 
obligated to honor the treaties made by the British, has, for practical purposes, 
continued to honor them. 219 The Government of Pakistan is relying on its social 
and economic programs to gradually bring the Pathans of the tribal areas into 
the mainstream of national life. 220 
208. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 8. 
209. [d. at 9. 
210. [d. at 44-45. 
211. [d. at 9. The effect of this modernization program on the people and culture of the tribal areas is 
well described by Ahmed. !d. 
212. [d. at 9. 
213. [d. at 44. 
214. [d. See also AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 31l. 
215. AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 44. For instance, Ahmed gives the 
example of a Public Works Department Engineer finding work on a road obstructed by a recalcitrant 
tribesman. In such a case, the engineer appeals to the Political Agent to use his influence to persuade the 
tribesman to allow construction to continue. [d. 
216. [d. at 45. 
217. See AHMED, ECONOMY AND SoCIETY, supra note 92, at 99. 
218. !d. at 92. 
219. [d. at 308. 
220. See generally AHMED, SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79. The economic programs in 
the tribal areas have begun to change attitudes among the Pathans. See generally AHMED, SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CHANGE,supra note 79. A new breed oftribesman is emerging who is deviating from the ideal 
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Currently, The Government of Pakistan is not enforcing its narcotics laws in 
the tribal areas. 221 One reason for this non-enforcement is the proximity of the 
tribal areas to the international border. 222 Each of the tribal agencies borders 
Afghanistan, allowing tribesmen to elude law enforcement officers by crossing 
into that nation. 223 Another reason for failure to enforce the narcotics ban in the 
tribal areas is the topography of the region. 224 The tribal areas lie in a rugged 
mountain region which reaches an elevation of 15,620 feet above sea level,225 
and is largely inaccessible. 226 A third, but perhaps the primary reason, is eco-
nomic. Much of the tribal areas are economically depressed and farmers often 
rely on the poppy for survival.227 
Any enforcement of Pakistan's narcotics laws in the present structure of the 
tribal areas must be accomplished through the Political Agent, with the assistance 
of the Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary.228 However, in light of the 
difficulties outlined above, the likelihood is that enforcement of the narcotics 
ban, like enforcement of the FCR, will be limited to the main roads and the 
agency headquarters. At least for the near future, the main law in the tribal areas 
will continue to be the Pukhtunwali, which does not prohibit the growing of 
opium. 229 
IV. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND PAKISTAN 
The international trade in opium and opium derivatives is governed by the 
terms of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 196 J230 and the 1972 Pro-
tocol Amending the Single Convention. 231 Although Pakistan is a party to the 
Single Convention, it has not signed the Amending Protocol. 232 As a result, the 
obligations of Pakistan under the existing control system arise solely under the 
Single Convention. 
Pukhtun role as embodied in the Pukhtunwali and is turning to economic gain through business and 
trade. SAYEED, POUTICS IN PAKISTAN, supra note 48, at 135. "The battle for the future of the Tribal 
Areas is neither political nor ethnic but largely economic and it will be decided on this front." AHMED, 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79, at 70. 
221. See GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 3. 
222. Ahmed Interview, supra note 81. 
223. [d. 
224. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 5. 
225. NYROP. supra note 4, at 68. 
226. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 5. 
227. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
228. The Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary are two of the law enforcement agencies 
coordinated by the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 6-7. 
229. Ahmed Interview, supra note 81. For a discussion of Pakistan's narcotics control efforts. 
see § V infra. 
230. Single Convention, supra note 3. 
231. Amending Protocol, supra note 17. 
232. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 3, at 323-26. 
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The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 196 j233 streamlined and updated 
the complicated and often conflicting system of international narcotics control 
that existed before 1961.234 At the end of the Second World War, six multilateral 
treaties governed the international control of narcotics. 235 In addition to these 
treaties, three more were added during the post-war period. 230 While each treaty 
further tightened the regulation of narcotics, the international system of control 
was obsolete as compared to the control efforts in most nations.237 Further, the 
treaties failed to provide for the effective control of opium poppy, coca and 
cannabis cultivation. 238 The international narcotics control machinery which had 
developed concurrently with this myriad of treaties was "more complex than was 
desirable or necessary."239 Four international organs existed which were con-
cerned exclusively with narcotics control: 240 the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs,241 the Permanent Central Opium Board,242 the Drug Supervisory 
Body243 and the World Health Organization (WHO) Expert Committee on 
Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction. This machinery often overlapped and led to 
an uneconomical duplication of efforts.244 
233. Single Convention, supra note 3. 
234. See generally Lande, The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 16 1NT'L ORG. 776, 776-81 
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Lande]. 
235. /d. at 776. These treaties were the International Opium Convention, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. No. 612, 
8 L.N.T.S. 187 Uan. 23,1912); International Opium Convention of 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317 (Feb. 19, 
1925); Agreement Concerning Prepared Opium, 51 L.N.T.S. 337 (Feb. II, 1925); Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. No. 863, 139 L.N.T.S. 301 Uuly 13, 1931); Agreement for the 
Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East, 177 L.N.T.S. 373 (Nov. 27,1931); Convention on Illicit 
Drug Traffic, 198 L.N.T.S. 299 (June 26,1936); listed in BRUNN, PAN & REXED,supra note 45, at 20-21. 
236. Lande, supra note 234, at 778. These three treaties were the Amending Protocol of 1946, 61 
Stat. 2230, T.I.A.S. No. 1671, 12 V.N.T.S. 179 (Dec. 11, 1946); Protocol Concerning Drugs Outside the 
1931 Convention, 2 V.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S. No. 2308,44 V.N.T.S. 277 (Nov. 19, 1948); and the Opium 
Protocol of 1953, 14 V.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 5273, 456 V.N.T.S. 3 (June 23, 1953); listed in BRUNN, PAN 
& REXED, supra note 45, at 20-21. 
237. Lande, supra note 234, at 779. Indeed, Lande points out that if the governments of the time had 
taken the treaties in force literally, a country could have allowed both the over-the-counter sale of raw 
opium, prepared opium, medicinal opium, cannabis and other narcotics and the unlicensed production 
of medicinal opium, prepared opium and hashish, along with the use of these drugs. without violating 
treaty obligations. [d. at 779-80. 
238. See id. at 780. The Opium Protocol of 1953, supra note 236, contained provisions to control 
cultivation of the opium poppy. Lande,supra note 234, at 780. However, the Protocol also required the 
adherence of at least three of seven named opium-producing nations to come into force. Id. By 1961, 
only two of these, India and Iran, had ratified the Protocol.Id. Three others, Bulgaria, the Soviet Vnion 
and Yugoslavia, had declared that they would not ratify the treaty. Id. 
239. Lande, supra note 234, at 778. 
240. Id. 
241. The Economic and Social Council of the V.N. established and gave permanent status to the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs on Feb. 18, 1946. Waddell, International Narcotics Control, 64 AM.]. INT'L 
L. 310, 316-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Waddell]. 
242. The International Opium Convention of 1925, supra note 235, created the Permanent Central 
Opium Board. 
243. The Convention on Narcotic Drugs Uuly 13, 1931),supra note 235, created the Drug Supervi-
sory Body. 
244. See Lande, supra note 234, at 77 8-79. 
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A. The Structure of International Control 
The Single Convention terminated and replaced the provisions of most of the 
narcotics treaties in existence at the time it entered into force. 245 It also consoli-
dated and replaced the complex supervisory machinery. The Convention re-
tained the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) of the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) and outlined its functions. 246 The 
Convention also consolidated the Permanent Central Opium Board and the 
Drug Supervisory Body into a new organ, the International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB).247 Generally, the CND functions primarily as a policy making 
body, while the INCB gathers the information necessary for the CND to formu-
late policy. 248 
I. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) gave the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs permanent status in 1946.249 Under the Single 
Convention, the CND is a policy-making body which makes recommendations to 
the ECOSOC for the "implementation of the aims and provisions" of the Con-
vention. 250 The CND has thirty member nations,251 which the ECOSOC selects 
to serve four-year terms. 252 The general criterion for selection is whether a 
nation is a producing and manufacturing country, a country with problems of 
illicit traffic in narcotics, or a country with a domestic drug addiction problem. 253 
After 1961, members of the specialized agencies and parties to the Single 
Convention, whether or not they were members of the United Nations, became 
eligible for CND membership.254 The CND meets on a biannual basis. 255 
The functions of the Commission under the Single Convention are to amend 
245. The Single Convention, supra note 3, entered into force on Dec. 13, 1964. BRUNN, PAN & REXED, 
supra note 45, at 20-21. The Convention terminated and replaced all of the treaties listed in notes 235 
and 236, supra, with the exception of the Convention on Illicit Drug Traffic (june 26, 1936), supra note 
235. Article 9 of the 1936 Convention was replaced by paragraph 2(b) of Article 36 of the Single 
Convention. See Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 44. 
246. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 8. 
247. Waddell, supra note 241, at 317. 
248. Note, Alternatives, supra note 49, at 245-46. 
249. Waddell, supra note 241. at 316-17. 
250. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 8(c). 
251. Note, Alternatives, supra note 49, at 245. In addition to the member nations, many non-member 
nations and international organizations send observers to CND meetings. Waddell, supra note 241, at 
317. 
252. BRUNN, PAN & REXED, supra note 45, at 300. 
253. /d. Pakistan is currently a member of the CND. 
254. /d. 
255. Note, Alternatives, supra note 49, at 245. 
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to Schedules,256 to oversee the licit trade in narcotics,257 and to prepare draft 
recommendations concerning narcotic drugs for the ECOSOC.258 Since the 
Commission meets infrequently, it must rely on the Division of Narcotic Drugs 
(DND), which serves as the Secretariat of the CND, to perform many of its 
functions. The DND conducts research on narcotics problems259 and provides 
information both on scientific advances in the narcotics field and on the activities 
of the international control bodies.260 The DND also prepares the provisional 
agenda for meetings of the Commission. 261 
2. The International Narcotics Control Board 
The Single Convention created the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) from two previously-existing control organs. 262 Prior to the 1971 
Amending Protocol,263 the INCB consisted of eleven members elected by the 
ECOSOC. 264 The ECOSOC selected three of the members from a list of at least 
five persons with medical, pharmacological or pharmaceutical experience sub-
mitted by the World Health Organization (WHO).265 The remaining members 
were selected by the ECOSOC from a list of nominees submitted by members of 
the United Nations and parties to the Single Convention who are not U.N. 
members.266 The Amending Protocol expanded the membership of the INCB to 
its current size of thirteen members.267 The ECOSOC continues to select three 
members of this enlarged board from a list of nominees proposed by WHO and 
chooses the remaining ten from persons nominated by members and non-
members of the United Nations. 268 
Under the Single Convention, the INCB collects and examines the annual 
estimates of legal drug requirements. 269 Parties to the Convention submit these 
256. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 8(a). The Single Convention assigned a narcotic drug to 
one of four schedules according to its dangerous propensities. For example, the Convention lists opium 
in Schedule I with other drugs considered to be most dangerous. The DND has the power to amend the 
Schedules in conjunction with the World Health Organization. 
257. Note, AlteTootives, supra note 49, at 245-46. 
258. [d. 
259. See BRUNN, PAN & REXED,supra note 45, at 95-98. The research carried out by the DND includes 
both scientific research and studies on problems such as illicit traffic and drug addiction. See [d. 
260. !d. at 98. The DND publishes the Bulletin on Narcotic Drugs, which covers both areas of 
information. !d. 
261. Note, Alternatives, supra note 49, at 246. 
262. Waddell, supra note 241, at 317. See also notes 242-43, 247 and accompanying text, supra. 
263. Amending Protocol, supra note 17. 
264. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 9( I). 
265. [d. art. 9(l)(a). 
266. [d. art. 9(l)(b). 
267. Amending Protocol, supra note 17, art. 2. 
268. [d. 
269. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(1). Production, consumption and trade in narcotics is 
governed by the Single Convention to ensure a supply of narcotic drugs for medical and scientific 
purposes. See generally, Single Convention, supra note 3, Preamble. 
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estimates in accordance with Article 19. The INCB also collects and examines the 
statistical returns on production, consumption, imports, exports, seizures and 
stocks of drugs, which the signatories furnish under Article 20.270 However, the 
INCB is not merely a body for the mechanical recording of data.271 In examin-
ing statistics, the INCB looks for possible treaty violations. 272 If it discovers a 
serious violation, the INCB can recommend to the other parties to the Conven-
tion that they stop the export or import of narcotic drugs for medical and 
scientific purposes to or from the offending nation.273 If a party which has not 
produced opium for export wishes to begin doing so, it must furnish certain 
information to the INCB.274 The country must supply information concerning 
its existing controls on trade and the countries to which it intends to export the 
opium. 275 The INCB may either approve the new production or recommend to 
the Party that it not engage in such production.276 
B. Obligations of Pakistan Under the Single Convention 
Under the Single Convention, parties are obligated to restrict the production, 
manufacture, export, import, distribution, use and possession of, and trade in, 
narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes, as provided in the Conven-
tion. 277 Parties must establish or adjust their national legislation to conform to 
the Convention. 278 Nations must also implement domestic programs for the 
licensing of manufacturers and wholesalers of narcotics, the issuing of permits 
and prescriptions for the dispensing of narcotic drugs, and the keeping of 
accurate records and reports concerning narcotics. 279 The Parties must also 
devise stringent domestic controls. 280 The Single Convention requires parties to: 
(1) furnish the INCB with statistics on the consumption of and estimates of the 
requirements for narcotic drugs;281 (2) maintain a system of export and import 
authorizations and certificates;282 (3) arrange for the treatment of addicts;283 
270. [d. art. 20. 
271. BRUNN, PAN & REXED, supra note 45, at 76. 
272. [d. 
273. [d. at 299. 
274. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(2). 
275. !d. 
276. BRUNN, PAN & REXED, supra note 45, at 299. With the exception of one or two nations, all 
countries, whether parties to the Single Convention or not, cooperate with the INCB. Report of the 
International Narcotics Control Board for 1979 (Summary), para. 19, U.N. Doc. E/I980/32/Rev. I 
(1980). 
277. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(c). For a list of the obligations of a party to the 
Convention, see BRUNN, PAN & REXED, supra note 45, at 46. 
278. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 4. 
279. !d. arts. 30, 34(b). 
280. [d. 
281. [d. arts. 19, 20. 
282. !d. art. 31. 
283. [d. art. 38. 
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(4) cooperate with other nations and international agencies in combating illicit 
traffic;284 (5) extradite offenders for punishment;285 and (6) take measures to 
repress illicit domestic traffic in narcotics. 286 
Under the Single Convention, Pakistan, as an opium producing nation, was 
required to assume additional obligations. Parties that permit the cultivation of 
the opium poppy for the production of opium must establish and maintain one 
or more specialized government agencies. 287 The agency designates areas where 
opium poppies may be grown,288 grants licenses to cultivators,289 specifies the 
extent of cultivation permitted290 and takes physical possession of the opium 
crop or licensed cultivators within four months of the harvest. 291 The agency has 
exclusive control over the import, export, wholesale trade and inventories of 
opium other than those stocks held by licensed292 manufacturers of opium 
alkaloids, medicinal opium or opium preparations.293 
The "transitional reservation" in Article 49 of the Single Convention tem-
porarily excused from compliance those countries where the non-medical use of 
specified narcotics was traditional and permitted prior to January 1, 1961,294 In 
light of the traditional non-medical use of opium and cannabis in its country, the 
Government of Pakistan availed itself of the Article 49 reservation upon sign-
ing the Convention.295 Pursuant to the reservation, Pakistan temporarily per-
mitted the quasi-medical use, production, manufacture and trade of opium, 
cannabis, cannabis resin, and extracts and tinctures of cannabis.296 However, 
Pakistan's obligations under the Single Convention are now in full effect since 
Article 49, paragraph 2, subparagraph (d) required that the quasi-medical use of 
opium be abolished within fifteen years of the coming into force of the Single 
Convention, i.e., by December 12, 1979.297 
284. [d. art. 35. 
285. [d. art. 36. 
286. [d. art. 35. 
287. [d. art. 23(1). 
288. [d. art. 23(2)(a). 
289. [d. art. 23(2)(b). 
290. [d. art. 23(2)(c). 
291. !d. art. 23(2)( d). 
292. Manufacturers are licensed under article 29, id. 
293. [d. art. 23(2)(e). "Opium alkaloids" refers to morphine. Lande, supra note 234, at 786. 
294. INCB Report, 1979, supra note 34, para. 10. 
295. [d. para. 12. Only five countries made transitional reservations under Article 49. Besides 
Pakistan, Argentina, Bangladesh. Burma and India took some of the transitional reservations allowed. 
For a list of these, see id. 
296. BRUNN. PAN & REXED. supra note 45 at 297 (Appendix A) (which contains a list of all Declara-
tions and Reservations made to the Single Convention as of Dec. 31. 1967). 
297. Single Convention. supra note 3, art. 49(2)(d) as described in INCB Report. 1979.supra note 34. 
para. 14. 
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V. NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS BY THE GoVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN 
A. Pre-1979 Efforts 
Under British rule, persons could legally purchase opium in what is now 
Pakistan from licensed vend shops or "vends."298 This practice was continued 
after Pakistan's independence.299 After 1961, under the Article 49 transitional 
reservation,30o the vends continued to dispense opium for quasi-medical pur-
poses.30 ! Although the government licensed the vends,302 the licensing generally 
proved unsatisfactory as a control mechanism, since the vends almost certainly 
dispensed not only opium grown legally,303 but also large quantities of the illegal 
harvest. 304 Illegal cultivation of and traffic in opium flourished, primarily for 
economic reasons.30' Many unlicensed farmers continued to grow opium and 
sell the crop on the black market, where prices were far greater than those paid 
by the government.306 
At a time when Pakistan was still a part of British India, the Government of 
India participated in the International Opium Convention of 1925.307 Pursuant 
to the obligations the 1925 Convention imposed, the Government of India 
passed the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930.308 This Act provided that no importa-
tion, exportation or transhipment of dangerous drugs309 was permitted except 
according to the rule adopted by the central government under Section 7(2) of 
the Act.3!0 The obligations of India as a party to the 1925 Convention devolved 
upon independence to both Pakistan and modern India.3ll As a result, the 
298. Ellis, sufrra note 52, at 696. 
299. See EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, sUfrra note 19, at 7. See also note 42 sUfrra. 
300. See text accompanying notes 294-97 sufrra. 
301. See EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, sufrra note 19, at 7. 
302. [d. 
303. Under the Single Convention, licensed farmers in Pakistan grew legal opium and sold their crop 
to the government. See text accompanying notes 39-44 sufrra. 
304. INCB Report, 1979, sUfrra note 34, para. 89. 
305. See EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, sufrra note 19, at 4. The licensing of farmers took place only in 
the settled areas and did not apply in the merged and tribal areas. [d. 
306. Edwards, An Eye for an Eye: Pakistan's Wild Frontier, 151 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, 1 I I, 130 Oan. 
1977) [hereinafter cited as Edwards]. For example, a poppy farmer in lower Swat, a merged area, 
could, in 1976, make the equivalent of$400 on a good half-acre of poppies by selling his crop illegally. 
The average farm income in the area at that time was less than $200 per year. [d. 
307. International Opium Convention of 1925, supra note 235. 
308. The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 was effective Feb. I, 1931, by a notification in the Gazette of 
India, Part I at 35. See CHOUDHRY, TAX LAW STUDIES, STUDY No.8, THE DANGEROUS DRUGS (IMPORT, 
EXPORT AND TRANSHIPMENT) RULES, 1967, at 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CHOUDHRY]. 
309. "Dangerous Drugs" included coca leaf, hemp, opium, and all manufactured drugs. [d. at 6. 
310. [d. at 4-5. 
311. Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order, 1947, Gazette ofindia Extra., Aug. 
14, 1947, reprinted in Jones, State Succession in the Matter of Treaties. 24 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 351, 370 
(1947). 
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Government of Pakistan continued to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act, 
1930.312 
In 1967, pursuant to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Sec-
tion 7(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, Pakistan passed the Dangerous 
Drugs (Import, Export and Transhipment) Rules, 1967 (Rules).313 These Rules 
apply to the import into, the export out of and the transhipment through 
Pakistan of dangerous drugs. 314 However, the Rules do not apply to the move-
ment of such drugs between provinces or within a single province.315 The Rules 
conform to the obligations of Pakistan under Article 31 of the Single Convention 
(Special Provisions for International Trade).316 Article 31 requires and the Rules 
establish procedures for the promulgation of licensing requirements, the is-
suance of licenses and the enforcement of licensing rules.317 The Rules also 
include sample import and export license forms318 which would fulfill the re-
quirements of Article 31.319 
B. The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 
Article 49(2)(d) of the Single Convention required Pakistan to abolish the 
quasi-medical use of opium by December 12, 1979.320 The Government of 
Pakistan had steadfastly maintained that this would be accomplished.321 In 
February 1979, President Zia, as part of the Islamization of Pakistan's laws,322 
issued a Presidential Order323 prohibiting all imports, exports, processing and 
312. The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 is still valid legislation in Pakistan. GAMMELGAARD,supra note 
42, at 7. 
313. Dangerous Drugs (Import, Export and Transhipment) Rules, 1967, Gazette of Pakistan, Ex-
traordinary, 1967, under Notification No. S.R.O. 224(R)/67, dated Dec. 28,1967 [hereinafter cited as 
the Rules] reprinted in CHOUDHRY,supra note 308, at 5. The Rules came into force onJan. I, 1968.Id. 
314. CHOUDHRY,supra note 308, at 5. For the purposes of the Rules, "dangerous drugs" is defined as 
the same as in the 1930 Act, supra note 309, except that it did not include prepared opium or 
diacetylmorphine. !d. at 6. 
315. Id. at 5. 
316. Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 31. 
317. See generally, CHOUDHRY, supra note 308, at 6-15. See also Single Convention, supra note 3, art. 31. 
318. CHOUDHRY, supra note 308, at 15-17. 
319.Id. 
320. 1NCB Report, 1979, supra note 34, para. 14. 
321. Id. para. 17. 
322. The Islamization of Pakistan's laws involves a return to the Shantih, the sacred law of Islam. 
Esposito, Perspectives on Islamic Law Reform: The Case of Pakistan, 13 N.Y.V.L. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217 
(1980). The two material sources of the Shari'ah are the Quran, the literal revealed word of Allah, and 
the Sunnah of the Prophet, a narrative report of the sayings and deeds ofthe Prophet Muhammad. Id. at 
218. 
323. The opening statement of the Enforcetnent of Hadd reads: 
Whereas it is necessary to modify the existing law relating to prohibition of intoxicants so as to 
bring it in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah; 
Now, therefore, in pursuance of the Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977, read with 
the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 (C.M.L.A. Order No.1 of 1977), and in exercise 
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possession of intoxicants. 324 Although the Chapters of the Enforcement of Hadd 
order speak primarily in terms of intoxicating liquors, Chapter One of the Order 
defines intoxicant as any article specified in the Schedule.325 The Schedule, in 
turn, includes opium and opium derivatives as defined in the Dangerous Drugs 
Act, 1930, and cannabis. 326 Under the Enforcement of Hadd, "[a] complete ban 
has been imposed on production, possession, processing, manufacture, sale and 
use of all intoxicant drugs."327 In addition to the Enforcement of Hadd Order, in 
June 1979, the Governor of the N.W.F.P. issued an order prohibiting poppy 
cultivation throughout that province. 328 
C. Narcotics Enforcement in Pakistan 
The primary agency involved in the coordination of narcotics control efforts 
in Pakistan is the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB).329 The Government 
of Pakistan330 created the PNCB in March 1973, in order to satisfy obligations 
imposed by the Single Convention. 33 ! The PNCB is a Department of the Minis-
try of Interior of the Pakistani Government.332 The PNCB has a number of 
duties, primarily of an advisory, supervisory and coordinating nature. 333 As the 
primary Federal drug agency in Pakistan, the PNCB is involved in all aspects of 
drug abuse control, including law enforcement, agricultural development in 
poppy-growing areas and the treatment and rehabilitation of addicted per-
sons.334 In executing programs in these areas, the policy of the PNCB is to 
involve the Provincial Governments as much as possible. 335 The PNCB also 
of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator is 
pleased to make the following Order: .... 
Enforcement of Hadd, supra note IS, at 33. 
324. See generally, Enforcement of Hadd, supra note IS, at 33-42. 
325. Id. at 34. The Schedule is a list of intoxicants prohibited by the Enforcement of Hadd. /d. at 34, 
41-42. 
326. Id. at 41-42. 
327. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 3. 
328. INCB Report, 1979, supra note 34, para. 90. The N.W.F.P. ban on cultivation was successfully 
enforced in 19S0 in the settled districts of the province. In 19S1, the ban was enforced in the merged 
districts with varying degrees of success. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 3. 
329. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 4. 
330. Id. 
331. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 36. 
Article 17 of the Single Convention calls upon each party to maintain a special administration for the 
purpose of applying the provisions of the Convention. Additionally, Article 35 suggests that each party 
designate an agency to coordinate action against illicit traffic. Single Convention, supra note 3. 
332. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 2. 
333. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 4. 
334. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 3. 
335. Id. Responsibilities for drug abuse control are divided between the Federal and Provincial 
Governments, due to Pakistan's Federal structure. GAMMELGAARD,supra note 42, at 6. For an examina-
tion of the problems of federalism in Pakistan, see generally Baxter, Constitution Making: the Development 
of Federalism in Pakistan, 24 ASIAN SURV. 1074 (1974) and Choudhury, "New" Pakistan's Constitution, 1973, 
2S THE MIDDLE E. J. 10 (1974). 
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negotiates with the United Nations and other countries for narcotics-related aid 
programs to Pakistan. 336 The PNCB then coordinates these aid programs inside 
of Pakistan.337 
The PNCB's primary enforcement role is to compile intelligence information 
and forward it to Provincial and Federal enforcement agencies.338 The PNCB 
has regional offices in the capitals of each of Pakistan's provinces. 339 In addition 
to coordinating the law enforcement agencies, in 1974, the PNCB began to build 
a capacity to act as an enforcement agency itself.34o However, the program was 
hampered by insufficient resources.341 Originally, the PNCB planned to develop 
twenty-five Field Investigation Units (FIU)342 within six months. 343 To date, the 
PNCB has established only thirteen FIUs.344 These units are stationed at 
strategic points on possible routes of narcotics traffic within the country.345 The 
problems of poor equipment and lack of adequate training has plagued Paki-
stan's enforcement efforts. The FlUs remain poorly equipped and largely im-
mobile. 346 The PNCB has taken measures to provide training and equipment to 
increase the efficiency of Pakistan's enforcement agencies in cooperation with 
the United States347 and the United Nations. 348 
One result of the 1979 ban on narcotics was the closing of the vends,349 
depriving many of the drug dependent persons in Pakistan of their main source 
of opium.350 In 1979, the Government of Pakistan began a program to register 
all persons addicted to opium. 351 Current estimates of the drug-dependent 
population in Pakistan range from 150,000 to 300,000 in a country of over 
336. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 31 (PNCB Charter). For a discussion of these programs, 
see § VI infra. 
337. See DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 31. 
338. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 7. The provincial enforcement agencies coordinated by the 
PNCB are the police forces, and the Excise and Taxation authorities of each province. The Federal 
agencies involved are the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Frontier Constabulary and the Rangers 
(an army auxiliary unit). EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME. supra note 19, at 31. 
339. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 6. 
340. [d. at 7. 
341. [d. 
342. [d. Each unit consists of approximately 29 officers. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 
37. 
343. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 7. 
344. [d. 
345. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19. at 37. The distribution of the FlU's is as follows; 
Islamabad, one unit; Sind Province, two units; Punjab Province, four units; N.W.F.P. five units; 
Baluchistan Province. one unit. [d. 
346. [d. at 36-37. 
347. U.S. aid programs are discussed in § VI.B infra. 
348. U.N. aid programs are discussed in § VI.A infra. 
349. See note 42, supra. 
350. See Ellis, supra note 52, at 696. 
351. INCB Report, 1979, supra note 34. para. 17. 
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eighty million people.352 The PNCB, with the assistance of the United Nations, 
has undertaken a number of programs designed to give medical treatment and 
vocational training to persons addicted to narcotics.353 
The efforts of the Government of Pakistan to combat the cultivation of and 
trade in opium and other narcotics have had a significant effect. Opium produc-
tion has declined drastically since the 1979 bumper crop.354 This decline is the 
result of increased enforcement of the narcotics ban by the PNCB and local 
enforcement agencies coupled with a sharp decline in the price of opium.35s 
However, the long-term solution to the problem of opium cultivation does not lie 
in enforcement alone. Opium cultivation takes place in economically depressed 
areas of Pakistan.356 In order to effectively halt the opium cultivation in these 
areas, a viable economic alternative to the growing of the opium poppy is 
necessary.357 The situation requires capital intensive development programs in 
opium growing regions. 35s Pakistan, as a developing country, lacks the resources 
to carry out such programs alone.359 
VI. NARCOTIcs-RELATED AID PROGRAMS TO PAKISTAN FROM 
OUTSIDE SOURCES 
A. United Nations Projects in Pakistan 
United Nations projects in Pakistan are funded and coordinated by the United 
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC).360 UNFDAC was first pro-
posed by the United States in 1970.361 The United Nations established UNFDAC 
in April, 197 J362 "as a special trust fund for the purpose of securing priority 
attention to urgent drug problems without diminishing the resources of other 
programs."363 Voluntary contributions from nations and private sources sustain 
the fund. 364 The United Nations designed UNFDAC to supplement, rather than 
352. PAKISTAN PROFlLE, supra note 4, at 3. 
353. These programs are discussed in § VI.A infra. 
354. The 1978-1979 bumper crop of opium totalled approximately 800 metric tons. The 1979-1980 
crop dropped to approximately 100 metric tons. The 1980-1981 crop declined further to approxi-
mately 85 metric tons. DRUG ABUSE CoNTROL, supra note 4, at 6. 
355. PAKISTAN PROFlLE, supra note 4, at 3. The price of raw opium has been depressed since 
mid-1979. See GAMMELGAARD. supra note 42. at 3. The low prices have been caused by a glut on the 
market since the 1979 bumper opium crop. Id. Gammelgaard estimates that the 1979 crop created a 
surplus of 400 metric tons of opium and that this surplus still exists. Id. 
356. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
357. Prospects for the 1980·s. supra note I, at 71 (prepared statement of Mathea Falco). 
358. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4. at 8. 
359. See id. at 9. 
360. See generally. Report of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.7/664 (1980) [hereinafter cited as UNFDAC Report. 1980]. 
361. BRUNN, PAN & REXED. supra note 45. at 18. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. at 109. 
364. See id. at 18 and UNFDAC Report. 1980,supra note 360, Annex III. The United States has. in 
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replace, bilateral activities of nations involved in international narcotics control 
programs. 365 However, UNFDAC projects are often the only narcotics control 
presence in a given country.366 
The program and budget of UNFDAC follow a two-tiered design.367 The first 
tier consists of country programs, which are development-oriented in nature and 
involve field work in those countries with major narcotics problems. 368 The 
second tier consists of headquarters projects, which supplement the regular 
activities of the various technical bodies of the United Nations working in the 
narcotics field. 369 UNFDAC gives priority to the country programs, which re-
ceived sixty-eight percent of the total 1980 budget and an estimated seventy-nine 
percent of the 1981 budget.370 UNFDAC administers and coordinates the coun-
try programs which it funds. 371 Agencies which have technical expertise in 
particular subject areas execute projects involving those subject areas.372 
Under the auspices of UNFDAC, the Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND) 
oversees projects involving law enforcement, research, and narcotics demand 
reduction. 373 The DND is the largest single executing agency,374 receiving 
roughly one-third of all UNFDAC funds in 1980.375 Other UNFDAC executing 
agencies and the area of expertise of each include: the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (preventative education); 
the World Health Organization (WHO) (health and treatment); the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) (vocational rehabilitation); the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) (training of national administrators); the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); and the United 
the past, borne a disproportionate share of the costs of UNFDAC. as compared with other nations. 
Federal Drug Strategy - 1979, supra note 2, at 12-13. Between 1971 and 1979. the United States 
contributed $28 million of the $42,316,062 total pledged by various countries to UNFDAC. UNFDAC 
Report, 1980, supra note 360, Annex III, at 3. Upset by this trend, but hoping to encourage other 
nations to increase their financial commitment to UNFDAC, the U.S. Congress reduced the 1981 U.S. 
contribution to UNFDAC proportionately to a figure in accordance with the 25% overall U.S. financial 
commitment to the United Nations system. Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1981 (part 4), 
Hearings and Markup before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
House of Representatives. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at xii-xiii (1980) (recommendations of the subcommit-
tee). Congress amended § 482(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 96-533. 94 Stat. 
3149 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 229Ia(3) (1980». limiting the U.S. contribution to UNFDAC 
in fiscal year 1981 to the lesser of $3 million a year or 25% of the total annual contributions by all 
nations. [d. 
365. Federal Drug Strategy - 1979, supra note 2. at 11-12. 
366. [d. at 12. 
361. UNFDAC Report. 1980. supra note 360. para. 2. 
368. [d. The country program in Pakistan is discussed at notes 388-425 and accompanying text infra. 
369. [d. 
370. [d. para. 3. 
371. [d. para. 12. 
372. [d. para. II. 
373. [d. 
374. [d. para. 4. 
375. [d. 
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Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (agricultural development proJ-
ects).376 
A large component of certain UNFDAC country programs is in the form of 
integrated rural development.:l 77 UNFDAC officials believe such development is 
essential to the long-term solution of the problem of illicit cultivation of the 
opium poppy, the coca bush and cannabis. 378 Integrated rural development 
utilizes crop substitution,379 in conjunction with other programs, in an effort to 
provide viable economic alternatives for persons who have previously relied on 
the opium poppy as their main cash crop.380 The first step of an UNFDAC 
integrated rural development project is the establishment of a pilot project. 38 ! 
The purpose of the pilot project is to develop social and economic programs 
which suit the needs of a particular narcotics-producing area. 382 Once the pilot 
project is completed, UNFDAC analyzes the results and expands the project, 
utilizing the lessons learned. 383 The ultimate goal of both integrated ru ral 
development and the other aspects of an UNFDAC country program is to 
provide a comprehensive and effective solution to the narcotics problems 
throughout the host country. 384 Successful pilot projects have demonstrated the 
feasibility of the concept. 3S5 One of the two successful projects:l 86 is the pilot 
project in the Buner subdivision of the District of Swat, a merged area ID 
Pakistan's N.W.F.P.387 
The UNFDAC country program ID Pakistan has been ID operation SIDce 
376. /d. para. 11. 
377. Cf id. paras. 14-15 (description of integrated rural development projects in Thailand and 
Pakistan). 
378. [d. para. 15. 
379. The concept of crop substitution involves the replacement of narcotic plants such as the opium 
poppy with alternative crops. BRUNN, PAN & REXED, supra note 45, at 204. One problem involved in 
crop substitution is the finding of crops which can provide an income to the farmer which is at least 
equal to that realized from poppy cultivation. See generally GAM MELGAARD, supra note 42, at 10-11. In 
order to accomplish crop substitution, a rural development program must often modernize farming 
techniques in the area and develop suitable marketing for new crops that are introduced. EXTENSION OF 
PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 21. 
The concept of crop substitution has existed for over fifty years. BRUNN, PAN & REXED, supra note 45, 
at 204. However, only recently have UNFDAC rural development programs achieved practical results 
in Pakistan and Thailand. See UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 14. For a review of the 
history of crop substitution prior to 1974, see BRUNN, PAN & REXED. supra note 45, at 204-21. 
380. See UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 53. 
381. See id. para. 14. 
382. See id. 
383. [d. 
384. See id. 
385. Id. 
386. [d. paras. 14 & 52. UNFDAC established the other successful pilot project in 1971 to deal with 
the illegal cultivation of the opium poppy in northern Thailand. [d. at 14. See also BRUNN, PAN & 
REXED, supra note 45, at 208. 
387. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra notc 19, at 9-10. Swat is a merged area where Pakistan is 
gradually enforcing its narcotics laws. [d. See text accompanying notes 71-79 supra. 
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1976. 3HH The program is coordinated with the Pakistan Narcotics Control 
Board.389 The program is assisting Pakistan in developing crop substitution390 in 
Buner, in treating and rehabilitating addicts in both rural and urban areas and in 
supporting law enforcement activities aimed at stemming the illegal traffic in 
narcotics.391 The executing agencies involved in the Pakistan program are the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO).392 
The accomplishments of UNFDAC in Pakistan have been considerable.393 
UNFDAC has expanded its programs as a result of the 1979 ban on narcotics in 
order to assist the greater numbers of opium addicts and poppy farmers in need 
of the rehabilitation and rural development programs. 394 The Buner pilot 
project is the primary component of the UNFDAC program in Pakistan. 395 The 
objective of the Buner project is to develop a realistic economic alternative to 
poppy cultivation. 396 Towards this end, the project has attempted to divert the 
rural economy of Buner away from dependence upon opium as the main cash 
crop.397 Project developers have placed emphasis on increasing the yield of grain 
crops already grown in the area398 and on introducing new cash crops into the 
area. 399 
The Buner area suffers from a shortage of surface water. 400 To overcome this 
388. UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 52. 
389. Id. For a description of the PNCB see text accompanying notes 329-48 supra. 
390. For a description of crop substitution see note 365 supra. 
391. UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 52. 
392. GAM MELGAARD, supra note 42, at 8. The country program in Pakistan is jointly funded by the 
Government of Pakistan and UNFDAC. From May 1976 to April 1981, the Government of Pakistan 
contributed $2,447,774 to the joint program. UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, Annex III, at 4. 
UNFDAC contributions from 1976 to 1980 totalled $2,637,500. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 24. 
393. For a complete discussion of UNFDAC's program in Pakistan see generally GAMMELGAARD, supra 
note 42, at 8-34. 
394. See UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 53. 
395. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 8. The PNCB is executing the project through the 
government of the N.W.F.P. and U.N. agencies. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 9. The U.N. executing 
agency from 1976 to 1979 was the DND. In 1979, the F AO became the executing agency of the project. 
Id. 
396. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 8. 
397. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 10. 
398. Id. at 12. These crops are primarily wheat and maize./d. By increasing the yield of these crops, 
they become more competitive as cash crops with the opium poppy. See GAMMELGAARD,supra note 42, at 
10-11. 
399. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 12. UNFDAC has introduced into the Buner region 
crops which are grown by farmers in other parts of Pakistan. Id. Most of these crops require irrigated 
land, while others can be grown with natural rainfall. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 10. The crops 
which require irrigation are sugarcane, tobacco, potato, garlic and tumeric. All of these are competitive 
with the opium poppy as a cash crop. /d. The ground nut is the only new crop which does not require 
irrigation. The profit from the groundnut is twice that of the opium poppy. Id. In addition, UNFDAC is 
in vestigating the possibility of mint and saffron as alternative cash crops for small farmers living in areas 
of higher elevation. /d. 
400. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 10. 
1983] IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 233 
barrier to successful crop substitution,401 the Buner project included construc-
tion of tubewells to expand ground water resources402 and several new surface 
irrigation programs. 403 The Buner project also included land deveiopment404 
efforts, such as land leveling and terrace construction.405 These land develop-
ment efforts are dual-purpose: to bring new acreage under cultivation and to 
guarantee maximum use of irrigation water through the prevention of water 
run-off.406 UNFDAC has also established an agricultural credit scheme in Buner 
to provide short and long-term credit to farmers who agree to stop growing 
opium. 407 Loans to farmers under this scheme totalled over $100,000 by Sep-
tember 1980. 408 Farmers use the money received from the credit scheme for 
leveling land and purchasing livestock. 409 
The UNFDAC country program in Pakistan also includes medical treatment 
and vocational rehabilitation programs for drug-dependent persons. 410 Under 
this program, addicts have received medical treatment at ten detoxification 
centers throughout the country.411 These centers have been successful in devel-
oping techniques for the medical treatment of addicts.412 The rehabilitation 
component of the Pakistan program, although largely experimental,413 has es-
tablished the viability of vocational training and job placement programs for 
former addicts in Pakistan.414 Vocational rehabilitation centers located in Karachi 
401. Many of the new crops require irrigation. See note 399 supra. 
402. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME,supra note 19, at 11. From 1978 to 1980, six tubewells were drilled. 
GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 12. These have irrigated approximately 1,000 acres of land. ld. 
403. ld. 
404. UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 54. 
405. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 12. 
406. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 12. The Buner project also includes some livestock develop-
ment.ld. at 14. Livestock development to date has primarily consisted of improved veterinary care for 
livestock in the area. ld. 
407. ld. at 13. The credit scheme is operated by the project and a local commercial bank. UNFDAC 
Report, 1980, para. 54. The loans are guaranteed by UNFDAC and the Government of Pakistan.ld. 
408. UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, at para. 54. 
409. ld. The assistance provided by the Buner project is not provided free of obligation. EXTENSION 
OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 11. The people in a village sign agreements by which they agree to give 
up poppy cultivation in return for assistance.ld. Five of the nineteen villages in Buner have signed such 
agreements. ld. UNFDAC expects the program to include all villages by 1985. ld. Individual farmers 
use funds from the credit plan to finance development of their own land. UNFDAC Report, 1980,supra 
note 360, para. 54. 
410. See generally GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 15-23. 
411. !d. at 16. The centers are located in the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta 
and Rawalpindi. Three other centers are operating in Gilgit in the Northern Areas of Pakistan. Another 
is operating in Chamla, in Buner. See id. and UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 59. 
412. From September 1977 to December 1980, the centers treated 7,814 patients. Of these, only 297 
remained addicted to narcotics, a success rate of over 96%. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 16. 
413. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME,supra note 19, at 17. The rehabilitation component of the UNFDAC 
program was necessarily experimental, as Pakistan is a country with almost no experience in vocational 
or social rehabilitation. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 19. 
414. ld. at 22. 
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and Hyderabad, operate in close cooperation with the detoxification centers in 
those cities. 413 Another \'ocational center in Nowagai is an integral part of the 
Buner project. 416 This center cooperates with the detoxification center in 
Chamla. 417 
The efforts of UNFDAC and the PNCB are continuing. UNFDAC extended 
the Buner pilot project, which was scheduled to end in 1981, for an additional 
three yearsY" Under the planned expansion, UNFDAC will increase the 
efficiency of the pilot acti\'ities and expand the segment of the population served 
by the programs. 419 The extended program contemplates additional projects in 
resource development and conservation, agricultural production of crops and 
li\'estock, development of additional credit schemes, marketing improvements, 
road construction and water system management. 420 The medical treatment and 
rehabilitation components of the program are also being expanded. 421 New 
projects are underway in the areas of law enforcement422 and preventive educa-
tion concerning drug abuse. 423 
The UNFDAC programs in Pakistan, especially the rural development project 
in Buner, have served as a starting point for eliminating cultivation of the opium 
poppy in Pakistan. 424 The United Nations has suggested that similar assistance 
be initiated through bilateral aid from individual nations. 425 
B. United States Projects in Pakistan 
In 1979, the U.S. Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEAl belie\'ed that the inability to control opium production in Southwest 
Asia represented the most serious heroin threat to the United States in recent 
years. 426 As a result of the increasing flow of opium and heroin from Pakistan, 
the U.S. government intensified its aid to Pakistan in an effort to bolster the 
415. /d. at 19. 
416. See EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 17; UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, 
para. 57. 
417. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 19. 
418. UNFDAC Report, 1980,supra note 360, para. 56. UNFDAC made the extension on the basis of 
a mission to Pakistan in mid-1980 by representatives from the FAO, UNDP and UNFDAC. /d. 
419. /d. 
420. Id. UNFDAC assistance over the three years will total approximately $4.18 million, while the 
Government of Pakistan will contribute 8.0 million rupees. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 13. I 
rupee equals .0976 U.S. dollars. Wall St. j., March 8,1982, at 41, col. I. 
421. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 30. This expansion involves an UNFDAC expenditure of 
$670,760 and a government contribution of 2,732,000 rupees. Id. 
422. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 16. UNFDAC will provide approximately $1.5 million to 
support law enforcement efforts of the PNCB.ld. 
423. GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 30. 
424. UNFDAC Report, 1980, supra note 360, para. 14. 
425. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1980, para. 88, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/52 
(1980). 
426. Federal Drug Strategy - 1979, supra note 2, at 8. 
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Pakistani campaign to combat the illicit cultivation of and trade in opium. 427 The 
United States has long occupied a leading role in the international drug control 
field. 42H The basic objectives of the U.S. efforts in Pakistan are the suppression of 
opium production, processing and trafficking to the greatest extent possible. 429 
In pursuit of this goal, the United States has encouraged the Government of 
Pakistan to enact stricter narcotics control legislation430 and to increase the 
authority of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. 431 The United States has also 
established, or plans to establish, a number of programs designed to increase the 
law enforcement capabilities of Pakistan, to finance studies of drug abuse in 
Pakistan and to provide resources for income replacement and rural develop-
ment to solve the problems caused by continuing opium cultivation in the 
N.W.F.P.432 
1. Law Enforcement Assistance 
The two principle agencies of the U.S. government involved in enforcement 
assistance programs in Pakistan are the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEAl and the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State (INM}.433 The DEA has assigned special agents to Pakistan since 
1972,'34 and five DEA agents are currently assigned to Pakistan;435 three are in 
Islamabad and two are in Karachi. 436 The INM assigned a full-time narcotics 
officer to tt e U.S. embassy in Islamabad in September 1979. 437 
427. See Prospects far the 1980's, supra note 1, at 98. 
428. The U.S. originally began pushing for a serious international effort to curb opium in 1906, 
when Congress discovered that a serious opium problem existed in the Philippines (which had been 
acquired by the U.S. after the Spanish-American War). BRUNN, PAN & REXED, supra note 45, at 10. U.S. 
diplomacy resulted in the International Opium Convention of 1912, (see note 235, supra) 1d. at 11. 
Between the First and Second World Wars, the U.S. initiated the Geneva Conference of 1924 and the 
1936 Convention on Illicit Traffic (see note 235, supra) see id. at 134-38. 
Since World War II, the United States has increasingly used its vast resources to ensure that other 
countries implement narcotics control efforts.1d. at 141. By granting or withholding bilateral aid to 
other nations, the United States has been able to motivate these nations to take action against illicit drug 
traffic.1d. at 147. See also Note, U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid to Nations Which do not Cooperate with the 
United States to Combat International Drug Traffic, 7 J. INT'L L. & POL. 361 (1974). The United States has 
also signed numerous bilateral agreements with other nations concerning narcotics. BRUNN, PAN & 
REXED, supra note 45, at 143-45. See also note 48 supra (concerning bilateral opium eradication efforts 
between the United States and Mexico). 
429. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 6. 
430. Id. 
431. Id. 
432. Id. 
433. See generally id. at 5-6. 
434. Id. at 5. 
435. Letter from Herbert Rathner, Program Officer, Asian Division, Bureau of International Nar-
cotics Matters, U.S. Department of State, to the author (Feb. 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Rathner]. 
436. Id. Much of the opium and heroin entering the illegal traffic in narcotics from Pakistan passes 
through Karachi, which is a port city on the Indian Ocean. See § II supra. 
437. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 5. 
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The United States and the Government of Pakistan signed the POKER 
agyeement on May 12, 1980.438 This agreement provides funds for the devel-
opment of a specialized narcotics unit within the Pakistan Customs Service. 439 
The agreement provides this unit with vehicles and other equipment and special-
ized training. 440 The two countries intend the unit to detect and halt illegal 
narcotics trafficking both within Pakistan and at the borders.441 
Training of Pakistan's enforcement officers was the subject of a 1980 U.S.-
Pakistan agreement. 442 This agreement provided funds for the training of Paki-
stan's enforcement officers both in Pakistan and in the United States. 443 The 
parties amended the agreement in 1981.444 The training in Pakistan takes place 
primarily at the Narcotics Law Enforcement Training School.445 The training 
agreements provided funds to purchase equipment for the school.446 The actual 
training has been conducted by instructors from Pakistan447 and from the DEA 
and the United States Customs Service. 448 In the first year of its operation, the 
school trained 425 Pakistani enforcement officers from the PNCB, Pakistan 
Customs, Coast Guards, Excise, Provincial Police forces and the Frontier Con-
stabulary.449 The training progyam in Pakistan has also included a boat handling 
course for customs personnel in Karachi. 450 
Training in the United States under the agreements consists of study tours to 
examine certain aspects of narcotics control in the United States.451 The Bureau 
of International Narcotics Matters has also agreed to provide the PNCB with 
$70,000 for the establishment of a forensic laboratory452 in Islamabad.453 The 
laboratory will allow the PNCB to chemically examine drugs seized in Paki-
438. Rathner, sufrra note 435. 
439. [d. The Poker agreement provides $150,000 for this purpose. [d. The Pakistan Customs Service 
is one of the law enforcement agencies coordinated by the PNCB. See note 325 sufrra. 
440. PAKISTAN PROFILE, sufrra note 4, at 6. 
441. Rathner, sUfrra note 435. 
442. [d. 
443. [d. The agreement totals $160,000. [d. 
444. [d. 
445. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 14-15. 
446. PAKISTAN PROFILE, sufrra note 4, at 6. 
447. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 15. 
448. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 6. 
449. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, sufrra note 4, at 15. 
450. Rathner, sUfrra note 435. 
451. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, sUfrra note 4, at 15. In 1980, two study tours visited the United States. 
One tour studied enforcement in the U.s. and included the Inspectors general of the N.W.F.P. and 
Baluchistan, two senior officers of the Pakistan Customs Service, and the Commandant of the Frontier 
Constabulary. [d. Another tour included four members of the National Coordination Committee of the 
PNCB and studied drug abuse control programs in the U.S. /d. The amended training agreement 
provides for twelve study tours to examine narcotics law enforcement, detoxification and rehabilitation 
in the United States. [d. at 16. 
452 PAKISTAN PROFILE, sUfrra note 4, at 6. The INM provided $20,000 for this project. [d. 
453. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 17. 
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stan. 454 The findings of the laboratory will provide scientific evidence for legal 
proceedings against those involved in illegal drug trafficking in Pakistan. 455 
To be effective, a comprehensive drug control program in Pakistan requires 
that the Government of Pakistan know of the drug abuse situation in the remote 
areas of the countryYH To assist the PNCB in obtaining this knowledge, the 
INM provided funds in 1980 for a study of drug abuse and related socioeco-
nomic factors in Gilgit in the Northern Areas of Pakistan.4.;7 
2. Development Aid Programs 
The Government of Pakistan is increasing its enforcement of the narcotics ban 
in the merged areas,458 resulting in economic harm to the opium farmers 
there.459 As a result of this harm and the success of the UN FDAC pilot project in 
Buner,460 opium farmers in other merged areas have demanded development 
assistance programs. 461 In response to this problem, the INM has provided 
funds for an agricultural outreach program. 462 The program provides seed, 
fertilizer and implements to farmers in the merged areas of Dir, Swat and 
Malakand.463 In 1981, the program introduced high yielding crops into selected 
demonstration plots in these merged areas. 464 The INM plans to eventually 
extend the program to the entire merged areas of the N.W.F.P.4H5 
The INM is currently involved in establishing an integrated rural develop-
ment project in the Malakand Agency, a merged area. 466 As envisioned, the 
project will be similar to UNFDAC's Buner project.467 In November 1981, the 
INM sent a three person team to the Malakand Agency to choose a site for the 
program. 468 The team chose a site and the INM is sending another team to 
Malakand for six to eight weeks to develop a project design. 469 The INM expects 
the United States and Pakistan to sign during the 1982 fiscal year.470 
454. /d. 
455. Id. 
456. Id. at 19. 
457. PAKISTAN PROFILE, supra note 4, at 6. The INM provided $65,000 for the Gilgit Survey. Id. 
458. DRUG ABUSE CoNTROL, supra note 4, at 5. 
459. Id. at 6, 8. 
460. See § VI.A supra. 
461. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 22. 
462. PAKISTAN PROFlLE, supra note 4, at 6. The INM provided $140,000, for the program. Id. 
463. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 23. 
464. Id. at 22-23. 
465. Id. at 23. 
466. Id. at 24. 
467. The project components agreed upon include water resource development, road improvement, 
livestock rearing, crop substitution, land levelling and terracing. /d. 
468. Telephone interview with Herbert Rathner, Program Officer. Asian Division, Bureau of Inter-
national Narcotics Matters, Department of State (Dec. 18, 1981). 
469. Rathner, supra note 435. 
470. /d. The estimated cost of the Malakand project is $1,350,000. PAKISTAN PROFILE,supra note 4, at 
6. 
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C. Projects in Pakistan by the Federal Republic of Germany 
The Federal Republic of Germany has recently begun to fund narcotics-
related programs in Pakistan. 471 The major German project is a rural develop-
ment projeect in the Gadoon area of the Swabi subdistrict of the Mardan District 
in the N .W.F.P.472 Although Gadoon lies in Mardan, onej of the settled districts 
of the N.W.F.P., it has the status of a merged area.473 Poppy cultivation in 
Gadoon is extensive. 474 A team of German experts visited the Gadoon area475 
and the PNCB has developed a project outline. 476 The Gadoon project will be 
similar to the Buner project and the developing U.S. project in the Malakand 
Agency.477 The PNCB expects the project to commence in 1982.478 
The Federal Republic of Germany is also providing funds for a national drug 
abuse survey in Pakistan. 479 The purpose of the survey is to measure the extent 
of drug abuse in Pakistan,480 in order to provide the PNCB with the information 
necessary to design and implement a national program to combat drug abuse. 481 
VII. CONTROLLING OPIUM CULTIVATION IN THE TRIBAL AREAS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The comprehensive approach of the Government of Pakistan to narcotics 
control embraces legislative measures, law enforcement efforts, drug treatment 
programs and integrated rural development. Within this approach lie the seeds 
of a solution to the problem of illicit opium cultivation in Pakistan. Pakistan is 
gradually extending enforcement of its narcotics laws into the merged areas of 
the N.W.F.P.482 Continued and increased multilateral and bilateral aid is essen-
tial if this extension is to continue. However, opium cultivation and heroin 
manufacture continue unabated in the tribal areas. 483 The Government of Paki-
stan has taken the position that the basic solution to the problem lies in income 
substitution for poppy farmers, coupled with enforcement procedures. 484 How-
471. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 19-20,23-24. 
472. [d. at 23-24. 
473. EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 73. 
474. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 23. In the 1980-1981 growing season, the Gadoon region 
produced 35 metric tons of illegal opium, more than 41 % of the total illegal crop in Pakistan in that 
year. [d. 
475. Id. at 24. 
476. [d. 
477. See id. The PNCB estimates that the Gadoon project will cost $10,000,000. [d. 
478. [d. 
479. [d. at 19-20. Pakistan and the Federal Republic of Germany signed the agreement in September 
1981. [d. The agreement provides DM 400,000 for the survey. !d. One DM equals .4269 U.S. dollars. 
The Wall 51. J., Mar. 8, 1982, at 41, col. 1. 
480. DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 20. 
481. See id. 
482. [d. at 5. 
483. See GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 4 and EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 4. 
484. INCB Report, 1980, supra note 425, para. 88. 
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ever, the semi-autonomous status of the tribal areas has prevented the narcotics 
laws from being enforced there.485 
Opium control programs in the tribal areas require an approach tailored to 
meet the problems created by the unique status of the region. The inhabitants of 
the tribal areas have historically resented and opposed the imposition of outside 
authority.486 One possible means of eliminating or at least reducing opium 
cultivation in the tribal areas487 is the use of integrated rural development 
programs administered through the existing administrative structure of the 
tribal areas. 488 Such an approach would utilize an outside influence to which the 
tribes are accustomed, while avoiding the appearance of a new outside threat to 
the tribal way of life. Such a program could be successful if the sponsoring 
agency or country, through the Government of Pakistan, approached the 
Pathans of the tribal areas through the Political Agent of each Agency.489 The 
agent would then present the proposal to the tribal jirga. 490 The agent would 
present any proposal for rural development in terms of the economic benefits to 
be received from the program, rather than in terms of the illegality of growing 
opium. The jirga may be more receptive to the offer of a rural development 
program after the economic advantages of the program have been demon-
strated.491 Once the Government of Pakistan, with multilateral and bilateral 
assistance, has initiated development programs, the Political Agent could admin-
ister and coordinate the programs, much as they have administered the eco-
nomic programs of the past few years. 4H2 
The problem of finding a viable economic alternative to growing opium 
remains. The planners of possible rural development programs for the tribal 
areas should consider the success of the UNFDAC pilot project in Buner.493 The 
Buner project, the projected U.S. sponsored program in the Malakand Agency 
and the Federal Republic of Germany's Gadoon project, all involve the Pathans 
485. See DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 5. 
486. See AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 93. 
487. This solution has been suggested by Akbar S. Ahmed, former Political Agent for South 
Waziristan. Ahmed Interview, supra note 81. 
488. For a discussion of integrated rural development programs in the merged areas of Pakistan, 
see § V I supra. 
489. For a discussion of the role of the Political Agent in the modern tribal areas, see § Ill.B.2 supra. 
490. For a discussion of the role of the tribal Jirga, see §§ IIl.A.3 and I1l.B.I supra. 
491. For a discussion of the economic advantages for opium farmers in Buner who abandon opium 
cultivation, see GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 10-11. See also notes 397-99 and accompanying text 
supra. 
492. For a description of the economic programs in the tribal areas and the role of the Political 
Agent, see generally AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79. See also AHMED, ECONOMY 
AND SoCIETY, supra note 92, at 310-11. 
493. For a discussion of the Buner pilot project, see GAMMELGAARD, supra note 42, at 8-15. See also 
EXTENSION OF PROGRAMME, supra note 19, at 9-14 and notes 381-95 and accompanying text supra. 
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of the merged areas. 494 These projects will provide a model for such projects in 
the tribal areas. 
The success of these projects may be influential in government negotiations 
with the jirgas of the tribal areas. The Government of Pakistan, in attempting to 
accompany rural development in the tribal areas with enforcement of Pakistan's 
narcotics laws, should emphasize the Islamic nature of those laws,495 rather than 
the illegality of growing opium. The fervent Islamic faith of the Pathans of the 
tribal areas should make them more receptive to arguments of a religious and 
moral nature as opposed to a legal one. 496 
The social and economic status of the tribal areas has been changing due to the 
many programs implemented by the Government of Pakistan in recent years. 497 
The Pathans of the tribal areas have identified more closely with the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan than they did to British India. 49B However, change comes 
slowly among the Pathans,499 thus preventing a speedy solution to the problem 
of illegal opium cultivation in the tribal areas. Only if the Government of 
Pakistan and the assisting international organizations and foreign governments 
carefully plan and tailor development programs to suit the needs of the tribal 
areas, will they achieve a long-term solution to the problem.50o A solution based 
on an economically viable alternative to opium cultivation and administered 
through the Political Agents and the tribal jirgas may put an end to illicit opium 
cultivation. At the same time, such a program could become an integral part of 
the overall programs designed to bring the tribal areas into the national life of 
Pakistan. 501 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The 1979 bumper crop of opium in Southwest Asia resulted in an increased 
flow of high quality heroin into the United States and Western Europe. In 1979, 
pursuant to its obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961, the Government of Pakistan imposed a total ban on the production and 
494. Compare DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, supra note 4, at 7 (map of the districts of the N .W.F.P.) with 
NYROP, supra note 4, at 125 (map of Pathan tribes of the N.W.F.P.). 
495. In particular, such an approach should emphasize the doctrine that the Holy Quaran forbids 
any substance causing detachment from reality. Illicit Drug Traffic, 1981 Report, supra note 57, para. 18 
(concerning the Islamic nature of Iran's anti-narcotics laws.). 
496. For a description of the Islamic faith of the Pathans, see AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra 
note 92, at 105-07. 
497. See generally AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 92. 
498. See AHMED, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 99. 
499. [d. at 94. 
500. Compare AHMED, SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79 (describing generally the neces-
sity of tailoring economic programs to the unique needs of the tribal areas) with PAKISTAN PROFILE,supra 
note 4, at I (reiterating the position of the Government of Pakistan that enforcement of the narcotics 
laws is not possible until opium farmers are provided with viable economic alternatives). 
501. See generally AHMED, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE, supra note 79. 
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use of narcotics. However, farmers still cultivate opium in the economically 
depressed tribal areas of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. Pakistan does 
not enforce its narcotics ban in these tribal areas due to a number of historical 
events which resulted in semi-autonomous status for the tribes in this region. 
The tribes retain this status, although their traditional distrust of outsiders is 
diminishing in the face of social and economic modernization programs carried 
out by the Government of Pakistan in the tribal areas. 
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 governs the international 
control of narcotics. Efforts by the Government of Pakistan to meet its obliga-
tions under this treaty have resulted in a marked decline in opium cultivation 
outside the tribal areas. In its efforts, Pakistan has been assisted by the United 
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the United States and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This assistance has primarily taken the form of enforce-
ment aid and integrated rural development. Development assistance has suc-
ceeded in finding viable economic alternatives to opium cultivation in certain 
merged areas of the Northwest Frontier Province. With additional outside assis-
tance, the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board is expanding development assis-
tance to other merged areas. However, the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board 
does not envision similar programs for the tribal areas in the immediate future. 
Pakistan's tribal areas pose unique problems for international narcotics con-
trol. With multilateral and bilateral assistance, the Government of Pakistan can 
overcome these problems by utilizing the concept of integrated rural develop-
ment. However, the parties involved must tailor these development programs to 
the unique nature of the tribal areas. Such rural development programs can 
overcome the difficulties presented by the tribal areas and end the cultivation of 
opium in Pakistan. 
Jack W. Murphy 
